Severability as Conditionality by Fish, Eric S.
Emory Law Journal 
Volume 64 Issue 5 
2015 
Severability as Conditionality 
Eric S. Fish 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj 
Recommended Citation 
Eric S. Fish, Severability as Conditionality, 64 Emory L. J. 1293 (2015). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol64/iss5/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu. 
FISH GALLEYS PROOFS 4/29/2015 1:15 PM 
 
SEVERABILITY AS CONDITIONALITY 
Eric S. Fish* 
The Supreme Court currently operates under the premise that if it finds one 
part of a law unconstitutional, it can strike down other parts as well. In 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, four justices would 
have exercised this power to strike down the entire Affordable Care Act on the 
basis of one unconstitutional provision. But it is not clear where the Court 
finds this power to declare laws inseverable. And that lack of clarity has 
created a doctrinal muddle wherein the Court applies several inconsistent 
tests. In this Article, I seek to clarify the scope of the inseverability power by 
considering several different theories of its source. Three such theories are 
implicit in the current judicial doctrine and academic debate about 
severability: (1) that it is an equitable remedial power, akin to the power to 
issue a civil injunction; (2) that it is a variant of intentionalist statutory 
interpretation, wherein courts strike down further provisions of a partially 
unconstitutional law so as to preserve the legislators’ hypothetical intentions; 
and (3) that it is a judicial contract remedy applied to legislative deals. This 
Article explores these three theories, teasing out their respective logics and 
showing that they are implausibly broad and inconsistent with Article III of the 
Constitution. 
This Article then develops and defends a fourth, narrower theory: that a 
court can declare a statute inseverable only where the legislature has made 
one part of the statute conditional on the continued validity of another. Such 
conditionality can most easily be found through explicit inseverability clauses. 
But it can also be found implicitly (analogous to the implied repeal and 
implied preemption doctrines) where severing a provision would make 
nonsense of a statute’s language, or where otherwise valid parts of a statute 
cannot have legal effect or do not serve any purpose without the 
unconstitutional provision. The main cost of this theory is that it only permits 
inseverability in limited circumstances, so it does not allow courts to rewrite 
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statutes to avoid the perverse consequences of judicial review. The benefits are 
that the theory is consistent with Article III, and that it prevents judges from 
acting too much like legislators. Two further implications follow from the 
conditionality theory: that there must be a party with standing to challenge an 
inseverable provision before a federal court can strike it down, and that the 
proper unit of analysis for severability questions is the entire legislative code 
(rather than a single act or bill). 
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INTRODUCTION 
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB), the 
Supreme Court upheld a provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) requiring 
individuals to purchase health insurance.1 In their dissent, Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito declared not only that they would have held this 
individual mandate unconstitutional, but also that they would have struck down 
the rest of the ACA in its entirety.2 Thus the dissenters would have invalidated 
provisions of the law establishing health insurance exchanges, raising the 
income cutoff for Medicaid, prohibiting insurance companies from turning 
away clients with preexisting conditions, providing benefits for sufferers of 
black lung disease, and granting the FDA authority to approve biosimilars, 
among many other things.3 The dissenters would have done so despite the fact 
that these provisions were perfectly constitutional, that they could have been 
enacted and enforced without the individual mandate, and that none of the 
parties before the Court had standing to challenge them.4 
Where did the dissenters find this awesome power? It is taken for granted 
in American legal thought that federal judges have the authority to strike down 
an entire statute because part of it is unconstitutional. But it is not clear where 
such a power comes from. Why should the invalidation of one part of a statute 
let a court strike down other, perfectly constitutional provisions? In doing so is 
the court employing an intrinsic judicial power to mark its red pen all over 
partially invalid laws? Or is it merely engaged in statutory interpretation, 
trying to preserve the legislators’ intentions after deleting part of their product? 
Because we lack a settled account of why judges can make statutes 
inseverable, judges have had little guidance in determining the scope and 
proper exercise of this power. This has created a doctrinal muddle. The 
Supreme Court has developed several different tests to determine severability, 
without any apparent unifying logic. It sometimes looks to whether the statute 
still works the way the legislature intended,5 sometimes to whether the 
 
 1 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 2 Id. at 2668 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“In our view, both these central 
provisions of the Act—the Individual Mandate and Medicaid Expansion—are invalid. It follows, as some of 
the parties urge, that all other provisions of the Act must fall as well.”). 
 3 See id. at 2675–76. 
 4 See id. at 2671. 
 5 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987) (“The more relevant inquiry in evaluating 
severability is whether the statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress.”); see also 
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2668 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“First, if the Court holds a 
statutory provision unconstitutional, it then determines whether the now truncated statute will operate in the 
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legislature would hypothetically have enacted the law without the invalid 
provision,6 sometimes to the presence of a severability clause,7 and sometimes 
to whether the provisions are capable of functioning independently.8 Yet when 
one follows the Court’s analysis in particular cases, all it seems to be doing is 
deciding whether severability is desirable as a matter of policy. As Robert 
Stern’s classic 1937 article observed, “the Court can easily hold any statute 
separable or inseparable, as it chooses.”9 
Academics have also treated the inseverability power as a given, without 
accounting for its source. It is a legal Beetlejuice—say its name and it appears, 
but no one knows where it comes from. There is vigorous debate about the 
proper scope of severability. Some scholars call for the courts to sever 
unconstitutional provisions absent a clear legislative statement to the  
 
 
manner Congress intended.”); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 247 (2005) (“Hence we must decide 
whether we would deviate less radically from Congress’ intended system (1) by superimposing the 
constitutional requirement announced today or (2) through elimination of some provisions of the statute.”). 
 6 See Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932) (“Unless it is evident that the 
legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is 
not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.”); see also Randall v. Sorrell, 
548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006) (“Given these difficulties, we believe the Vermont Legislature would have intended 
us to set aside the statute’s contribution limits, leaving the legislature free to rewrite those provisions in light of 
the constitutional difficulties we have identified.”); Denver Area Ed. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 
518 U.S. 727, 767 (1996) (plurality opinion) (“The question is one of legislative intent: Would Congress still 
‘have passed’ § 10(a) ‘had it known’ that the ‘remaining provision[s were] invalid’? If so, we need not 
invalidate all three provisions.” (alteration in original) (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 
491, 506 (1985))); accord NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607; Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 
320, 330 (2006); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999); Regan v. 
Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653 (1984) (plurality opinion); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (per 
curiam); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 (1968). 
 7 See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686; Brockett, 472 U.S. at 506; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931–34 
(1983) (“Here, however, we need not embark on that elusive inquiry since Congress itself has provided the 
answer to the question of severability in § 406 of the Immigration and Nationality Act . . . .”); Champlin Ref. 
Co., 286 U.S. at 235; see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (“The chapter of the United States Code that contains 
§ 1396c includes a severability clause confirming that we need go no further.”). 
 8 United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220–21 (1876); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting 
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509 (2010) (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley “remains fully operative as law” and that 
“[t]he remaining provisions are not incapable of functioning independently” (quoting, in turn, New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992) and Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 70 (1922) (“Section 4 with its penalty to secure compliance with the 
regulations of Boards of Trade is so interwoven with those regulations that they cannot be separated. None of 
them can stand.”). 
 9 Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REV. 76, 
111 (1937). 
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contrary.10 Others argue that the courts should rarely sever.11 Still others argue 
that courts should always (or should never) treat severability (or inseverability) 
clauses as controlling.12 Dean Tom Campbell, a former member of Congress, 
has taken the position that no part of a statute should ever be deemed 
severable—that if even a tiny, inconsequential provision is held 
unconstitutional the whole thing must fall.13 All of these academic 
commentators defend their preferred approaches by appealing to principles of 
judicial interpretation, separation of powers concerns, and normative views 
about the proper role of the judiciary. But none of this work has answered the 
fundamental question of where judges find this power in the first place. 
This Article seeks to answer that question. It does so by articulating three 
different theories of the federal judicial authority to declare statutes 
inseverable, rejecting each of these theories, and then showing that a fourth 
theory is the most plausible account of the inseverability power. Each of the 
initial three initial theories is, to a greater or lesser extent, implicit in the 
existing judicial and academic commentary on severability. However they 
 
 10 See Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REV. 41, 79–80 (1995) 
(arguing for a default presumption of severability); John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203, 
206 (1993) (same); Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 227, 272–78 (2004) (same); Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other 
Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 21–27 (1984) (arguing that every unconstitutional provision should be held 
severable unless Congress has provided an explicit inseverability clause); Kevin C. Walsh, Partial 
Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 777–89 (2010) (same); see also Tobias A. Dorsey, Remarks, 
Sense and Severability, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 877, 891–92 (2012) (arguing that courts should always find 
unconstitutional provisions severable, without exception); Rachel J. Ezzell, Note, Statutory Interdependence in 
Severability Analysis, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1481, 1481 (2013) (arguing for a “qualified clear statement rule,” 
where statutes would be severable unless (1) there is an inseverability clause or (2) the severed law could not 
logically be enforced). 
 11 Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1994) 
(arguing for a default presumption of inseverability); David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639 (2008) (advocating inseverability if severing a provision would substantially 
change the statute). 
 12 See, e.g., Israel E. Friedman, Comment, Inseverability Clauses in Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 904 
(1997) (arguing that inseverability clauses should always be respected, but that severability clauses can 
sometimes be ignored); see also Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 339–42 (2007) 
(defining limits to fallback law, including severability and inseverability clauses, namely that they cannot be 
impermissibly coercive to courts); Dorsey, supra note 10, at 892 (arguing that inseverability clauses are 
nullities that cannot be enforced, and that severability clauses are redundant); Fred Kameny, Are Inseverability 
Clauses Constitutional?, 68 ALB. L. REV. 997, 1001 (2005) (arguing that inseverability clauses are 
unconstitutional when they attempt to coerce the judiciary or are intended as a weapon to eliminate a law); 
Movsesian, supra note 10, at 73–79 (arguing for a purely textualist approach to severability, including strict 
adherence to severability clauses); Nagle, supra note 10, at 206 (arguing that severability and inseverability 
clauses should be applied according to their plain meaning). 
 13 Tom Campbell, Severability of Statutes, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1495 (2011). 
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have not heretofore been fully described or explicitly distinguished. The first 
theory is that federal judges have an equitable remedial power to strike down 
or edit partly unconstitutional statutes. The second theory (and the theory that 
best fits the Supreme Court’s current doctrinal tests) is that severability is a 
form of hypothetical intent-based statutory interpretation, where the reviewing 
court asks whether all of a statute’s remaining provisions still further the goals 
of the legislature, and “interprets” the statute to invalidate those provisions that 
do not. This second theory is premised on the belief that if the legislature had 
known the one provision was unconstitutional it would have preferred that the 
others fall as well. The third theory is that legislative deals are enforceable as 
contracts, and that judges can make statutes inseverable to guarantee legislators 
the benefit of their bargain. The final theory, which this Article defends, is that 
inseverability is the product of a legislative decision to make one part of a 
statute conditional on another part of a statute. A legislature can create such 
conditionality explicitly through an inseverability clause.14 But it can also do 
so implicitly by writing a statutory provision so that its text is nonsensical 
without the unconstitutional language, so that it cannot have legal effect 
without the unconstitutional language, or so that it serves no plausible purpose 
without the unconstitutional language. 
As this Article will show, only the last theory—legislative conditionality—
is both plausible as an account of severability and compatible with the federal 
judiciary’s limited powers under Article III. The main benefit of the 
conditionality theory is that it limits the incidence of judges reasoning like 
legislatures. The line between “legislative” and “judicial” reasoning, 
admittedly, is often slippery, and much ink has been spilled debating whether 
judicial review can ever be truly policy neutral. But current severability 
doctrine goes far beyond the “policymaking” that inheres in normal 
constitutional review, since judges finding statutes inseverable are not limited 
by any interpretation of the constitutional text, but instead are able to invalidate 
provisions merely on the grounds that they are bad policy or that the legislature 
hypothetically would not have wanted them. Such judicial repeal of statutory 
language is hard to distinguish from legislative repeal. Legislative 
conditionality solves this problem because it turns severability into a legitimate 
statutory interpretation issue, not an inquiry into the policy consequences of 
severing a provision. It also, in the great majority of cases, lets Congress 
 
 14 See, e.g., Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 334(g)(3), 91 Stat. 1509, 1547 
(“If any provision of this subsection . . . is held invalid . . . the application of this subsection to any other 
persons or circumstances shall also be considered invalid.”). 
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determine the proper remedy by letting the political process continue, rather 
than rewinding that process by deleting an entire law. The major downside of 
the conditionality theory is that it does not permit judges to avoid the perverse 
consequences of judicial review, which include leaving behind an illogical law 
that Congress never would have enacted. But this harm is mitigated by the 
possibility of a legislative solution such as an amendment, a repeal, or an 
explicit inseverability clause. The conditionality theory also has two important 
implications for severability doctrine. First, a federal court cannot strike down 
a provision as inseverable unless it has a party with standing to challenge that 
provision. Second, there is no reason to constrain severability analysis to only 
a single bill or a single act—any statutory provision can be made conditional 
on another provision anywhere else in the legislative code, as long as Congress 
so provides (explicitly or implicitly). 
The argument of this Article proceeds in six parts. Part I tracks how the 
Supreme Court’s current ad hoc approach to severability has evolved over 
time, describes the three severability tests that the Court applies, and shows 
that the Court inevitably makes policy judgments when it applies these tests. 
Part II introduces the basic problem: that judges must either act like legislators 
or else enforce a statutory regime that Congress never meant to enact. Part III 
shows that the proper framing question when debating theories of severability 
is to ask how courts can find statutory language inseverable, rather than how 
courts can find statutes severable. Part IV describes the first three theories of 
judges’ power to declare statutes inseverable (that it is an equitable remedial 
power, that it is a matter of hypothetical legislative intent, and that it is a form 
of contract remedy), showing the flaws in each. Part V presents the legislative 
conditionality theory and lays out its consequences, showing that 
conditionality can be found by implication, requires standing, and is not 
limited to provisions within a single bill or act. Part VI considers the practical 
implications of the conditionality theory. It demonstrates that any harm from 
legislative conditionality is mitigated by legislative overrides and the greater 
use of inseverability clauses, that state and not federal judges should determine 
whether state statutes are inseverable, that state judges might legitimately 
exercise a broader inseverability power than can federal judges, and that 
adopting the conditionality theory would not require a major break from the 
Supreme Court’s current severability precedents (although the theory is likely 
inconsistent with parts of the holdings in two recent Supreme Court cases). 
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I. THE SUPREME COURT’S CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO SEVERABILITY 
Severability doctrine is confusing. The Supreme Court currently applies 
three very different tests. The first is to ask whether the remaining provisions 
of the statute are capable of functioning independently of the unconstitutional 
provision (the independence test). The second is to ask whether Congress 
would have passed the legislation without the severed provision—or, as it is 
sometimes framed, whether Congress would have wanted the whole enactment 
to fall, or just the unconstitutional part (the hypothetical passage test). The 
third is to ask whether the legislation operates in the way Congress intended if 
the unconstitutional piece is severed (the intent test). At the oral argument in 
NFIB, some of the justices expressed confusion about which of these tests they 
were supposed to apply.15 The dissenters who would have struck down the 
entire ACA recited the intent test and the hypothetical passage test, while the 
controlling opinion by Chief Justice Roberts relied only on the hypothetical 
passage test in finding the Act’s Medicaid expansion severable.16 And they 
 
 15 For example, Justice Scalia and Paul Clement engaged in the following colloquy: 
JUSTICE SCALIA: . . . . Why do we look to the—are you sure we look to the intent of the 
Congress? I thought that, you know, sometimes Congress says that these provisions will—all the 
provisions of this Act will be severable, and we ignore that when the Act really won’t work, 
when the remaining provisions just won’t work. Now, how can you square that reality with the 
proposition that what we’re looking for here is what would this Congress have wanted?  
MR. CLEMENT: Well, two responses, Justice Scalia: We can look at this Court’s cases on 
severability, and they all formulate the test a little bit differently.  
JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes, they sure do.  
Transcript of Oral Argument, Day 2, at 9, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Nos. 11-393 & 11-400), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-393.pdf. Similarly, Justice Kennedy 
asked, 
If you—suppose you had party A wants proposal number 1; party B wants proposal number 2. 
Completely unrelated. One is airline rates; the other is milk regulation. And we—and they decide 
them together. The procedural rules are these have to be voted on as one. They are both passed. 
Then one is declared unconstitutional. The other can operate completely independently. Now, we 
know that Congress would not have intended to pass one without the other. Is that the end of it, 
or is there some different test? Because we don’t want to go into legislative history, that’s 
intrusive, so we ask whether or not an objective—as an objective rational matter, one could 
function without—I still don’t know what the test is that we’re supposed to apply. And this is the 
same question as Justice Scalia asked. Could you give me some help on that? 
Id. at 17–18. 
 16 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (“The question here is whether Congress would have wanted the rest of the 
Act to stand, had it known that States would have a genuine choice whether to participate in the new Medicaid 
expansion.”); id. at 2668–69 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“First, if the Court holds a 
statutory provision unconstitutional, it then determines whether the now truncated statute will operate in the 
manner Congress intended. . . . Second, even if the remaining provisions can operate as Congress designed 
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asked severability, “What is thy name?” And severability answered, “My name 
is Legion: for we are many.” This Part will show how the doctrine has evolved 
into this confusing multitude. It will also show that the Court essentially makes 
policy judgments when it finds statutes inseverable.17 
The Supreme Court’s first severability decision was Marbury v. Madison, 
in which the Court struck down a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that 
extended the Court’s original jurisdiction beyond the limit set by the 
Constitution.18 Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion did not discuss 
severability, but it implicitly found that the entire Judiciary Act did not have to 
fall along with the problematic provision. He could hardly have held otherwise 
without destroying the federal judiciary. In an 1829 case, Bank of Hamilton v. 
Lessee of Dudley, Chief Justice Marshall first acknowledged the principle that 
when a provision is struck down, the rest of the statute may remain in force.19 
The first court to discuss the rationale for inseverability, and to find a statute 
inseverable, was the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the 1854 case of 
Warren v. Mayor of Charlestown.20 The court in that case articulated both the 
independence test and the hypothetical passage test: 
[T]he parts, so held respectively constitutional and unconstitutional, 
must be wholly independent of each other. But if they are so mutually 
connected with and dependent on each other, as conditions, 
considerations or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief 
that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that, if all could not 
be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue 
independently, and some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions 
which are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fall with 
them.21 
This two-part approach was adopted by other state supreme courts,22 and 
ultimately by the United States Supreme Court in the 1880 case Allen v. 
Louisiana.23 It was applied during the mid- to late-1800s, though with a 
 
them to operate, the Court must determine if Congress would have enacted them standing alone and without 
the unconstitutional portion.”). 
 17 For more on the history of severability doctrine, see Kenneth A. Klukowski, Severability Doctrine: 
How Much of a Statute Should Federal Courts Invalidate?, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 10–30 (2011); Stern, 
supra note 9, at 79–82. 
 18 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175–76 (1803). 
 19 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492, 526 (1829). 
 20 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84 (1854). 
 21 Id. at 99. 
 22 See Klukowski, supra note 17, at 8; Stern, supra note 9, at 80. 
 23 103 U.S. 80, 83–84 (1881). 
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healthy degree of caution. Courts were generally reluctant, in that period, to 
damn the whole statute for the sins of the part.24 
This favoring of severance ended in the early 1900s, when the Supreme 
Court began adopting a more aggressive approach to judicial review. Prior to 
1910 the Court had found state statutes inseverable in only two cases and a 
federal statute inseverable in only one.25 From 1910 to 1937, it would find state 
statutes inseverable in seven cases and federal statutes inseverable in five.26 In 
this period the Court frequently used findings of inseverability to strike down 
laws that interfered with the free market, such as taxes, industry regulations, 
price controls, and so forth. This new approach occasioned a default rule 
presuming statutes to be inseverable. The Court announced in Williams v. 
Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana that it presumed “that the legislature intends an 
act to be effective as an entirety,” and that any unconstitutional provision 
would thus be held inseverable unless it were clearly shown to be independent 
from the rest of the statute.27 The Court reversed this presumption of 
 
 24 See Stern, supra note 9, at 81 (“During this early period, the courts were very reluctant to invalidate an 
entire law on grounds of inseparability. Doubts were resolved in favor of the severance of legislation; indeed, 
in a number of cases, in both state and federal courts, it was apparently assumed that laws were intended to be 
sustained to the extent that they could possibly be held valid. Although the language of presumption was not 
employed, it is clear that the courts at that time presumed that laws were intended to be severable, rather than 
the contrary.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 25 Allen, 103 U.S. 80; see also Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895); Poindexter v. 
Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884); Stern, supra note 9, at 107–08 n.138. Note that this list includes only those 
cases in which the Court held that the unconstitutionality of one provision required striking down one or more 
entirely separate provisions. It does not include cases where the Court struck down a provision with some 
constitutional applications and some unconstitutional applications (e.g., a provision regulating both intra- and 
interstate commerce). See Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452 (1908). For lists of the latter type of 
case from this period, see Alfred Hayes, Jr., Partial Unconstitutionality with Special Reference to the 
Corporation Tax, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 120, 124 n.8 (1911); Stern, supra note 9, at 90 nn.64–65. This list also 
does not include cases where the Court struck down an entire statute because it contained an unconstitutional 
exception, because that situation does not create a severability question. Rather, it presents the Court with a 
choice of whether to remedy the constitutional violation by striking down the rule or the exception to the rule. 
See infra note 71. 
 26 The seven state law cases are as follows: Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 278 U.S. 235, 241–42 
(1929); Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co. of Embden, N.D., 258 U.S. 50, 60 (1922); Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 
178, 190–91 (1917); McFarland v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 87 (1916); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 
368, 370 (1915); Harrison v. St. Louis & S.F. R.R., 232 U.S. 318, 332–34 (1914); Int’l Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 
217 U.S. 91, 114 (1910). The five federal law cases are as follows: Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 
316 (1936); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 361–62 (1935); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 70–71 
(1922); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362–63 (1911); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381–
82 (1910). For more on inseverability of statutes, see Stern, supra note 9, at 107 n.138. The qualifications 
about severable applications and striking down the exception versus the rule, both mentioned supra note 25 
and infra note 71, also apply to this list. 
 27 278 U.S. at 241–42. 
FISH GALLEYS PROOFS 4/29/2015 1:15 PM 
2015] SEVERABILITY AS CONDITIONALITY 1303 
inseverability if the statute contained an explicit severability clause.28 
However, in many cases during this period, the Court found statutes 
inseverable despite such clauses.29 While the Court in these years was more 
willing to strike down statutes in toto, the tests for determining severability 
remained essentially the same. The Court still looked to the independence test 
and the hypothetical passage test that had been elaborated in Warren and Allen. 
For example it declared in Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Commission that 
“[u]nless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted those 
provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the 
invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.”30 
Since the end of the Lochner era, the Supreme Court has been more 
reluctant to find statutes inseverable. Since 1940 it has found a federal statute 
inseverable in only one case, United States v. Booker,31 and has found an 
executive order inseverable in one other case, Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa Indians.32 When reviewing state laws, the Court has usually either 
found them severable or, per Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,33 avoided the 
question so that it could be decided as a matter of state law.34 It has declared 
 
 28 Id. at 242 (“The effect of the statutory declaration is to create in the place of the presumption just 
stated the opposite one of separability. That is to say, we begin, in the light of the declaration, with the 
presumption that the legislature intended the act to be divisible; and this presumption must be overcome by 
considerations which make evident the inseparability of its provisions or the clear probability that the invalid 
part being eliminated the legislature would not have been satisfied with what remains.”). 
 29 See Carter, 298 U.S. at 312–13; R.R. Ret. Bd., 295 U.S. at 361–62; Hill, 259 U.S. at 71. 
 30 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932); see also Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924) (“But a provision, 
inherently unobjectionable, cannot be deemed separable unless it appears both that, standing alone, legal effect 
can be given to it and that the legislature intended the provision to stand, in case others included in the act and 
held bad should fall.”); Stern, supra note 9, at 76 (“The inquisitive legislator seeking light on this problem will 
find that the Supreme Court, the state courts, and secondary authorities all appear to agree that the invalidity of 
part of a law or of some of its applications will not affect the remainder (1) if the valid provisions or 
applications are capable of being given legal effect standing alone, and (2) if the legislature would have 
intended them to stand with the invalid provisions stricken out.”).  
 31 543 U.S. 220 (2005). I am not counting Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line 
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), as a severability decision, because that case concerned potentially severable 
applications of the same statutory language (a provision granting bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over cases) 
rather than the severability of different statutory language. 
 32 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999). 
 33 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 34 See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 331 (2006); Leavitt v. Jane L., 
518 U.S. 137, 139–40 (1996) (per curiam); Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 624 (1985); 
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 178 (1959); Watson v. Buck, 
313 U.S. 387, 396 (1941). For a more complete list of such cases, see Ryan Scoville, The New General 
Common Law of Severability, 91 TEX. L. REV. 543, 564 n.139 (2013). Professor Scoville argues that Ayotte 
portends that the Supreme Court will begin applying a federal common law of severability to state statutes. Id. 
at 569–74. However this is probably an overreading of part of the opinion, which elsewhere explicitly refers to 
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state laws inseverable in only a handful of cases.35 Keeping with this trend, the 
Court in 1983 reversed the presumption it had announced in Williams, 
establishing that “the presumption is in favor of severability” even if the statute 
lacks a severability clause.36 This declining willingness to strike down statutes 
in their entirety, or to determine that some provisions must fall alongside 
others, has coincided with a massive increase in the length and complexity of 
federal legislation.37 Many of the Court’s major recent severability decisions 
have involved federal laws that are hundreds or thousands of pages in length—
for example Booker, NFIB,38 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock,39 and Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.40 The 
modern trend thus might be explained in part by the Court’s unwillingness to 
search every inch of a legislative giant for connected pieces, or to bring such a 
giant down by its toe.41 However this relative lack of inseverability holdings 
may not persist into the future. The fact that four Supreme Court justices in 
 
New Hampshire law. See Kevin C. Walsh, There Is No General Common Law of Severability, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
SEE ALSO 49 (2012). 
 35 After extensive searching I have located only six post-1940 cases in which the Supreme Court declared 
a state statute inseverable, but it is possible that some have eluded my grasp. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 
230, 262 (2006); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 764–65 (1986); 
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 445 n.37 (1983); Planned Parenthood of 
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 83 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371 n.21 (1975); Sloan v. 
Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 833–35 (1973).  
 36 Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653 (1983) (plurality opinion); see also Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328–29; 
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987) (“In the absence of a severability clause, however, 
Congress’ silence is just that—silence—and does not raise a presumption against severability.”). 
 37 See W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the 
Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 402–03 (1992) (“The United States Code consisted of 27,308 pages in 
1988, . . . compared to 9797 pages in 1964, the last year in which it was subjected to major revision before the 
great expansion of federal law that started in the sixties. . . . Federal statutes have also become more 
complicated. The number of subjects they treat has increased and so has the technological difficulty of many 
of the subjects.” (footnote omitted)); Christopher Beam, Paper Weight: The Health Care Bill is More than 
1,000 Pages. Is that a Lot?, SLATE (Aug. 20, 2009, 6:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/explainer/2009/08/paper_weight.html (noting several examples of recent laws that were 
over 1,000 pages, that “the total number of pages of legislation has gone up from slightly more than 2,000 
pages in 1948 to more than 7,000 pages in 2006,” and that “[t]he average bill length increased over the same 
period from 2.5 pages to 15.2 pages”). 
 38 See 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2675 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 39 480 U.S. at 684. 
 40 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (striking down for-cause removal limitations for the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, and finding them severable them from the rest of Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 41 Cf. Transcript, supra note 15, at 38 (“JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Kneedler, what happened to the Eighth 
Amendment? You really want us to go through these 2,700 pages? (Laughter.) JUSTICE SCALIA: And do 
you really expect the Court to do that? Or do you expect us to give this function to our law clerks? (Laughter.) 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Is this not totally unrealistic, that we’re going to go through this enormous bill item by 
item and decide each one?”). 
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NFIB were willing to strike down the entire ACA because of one 
unconstitutional provision, and that none of the other justices voiced 
disagreement on this point, could portend more aggressive exercise of this 
power. 
Notwithstanding this increased reluctance to declare laws inseverable, the 
Supreme Court in the 1980s introduced a new test that seems to make it harder 
to slice them apart, and that renders the doctrine more confusing. In Alaska 
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, after reciting the classic independence and hypothetical 
passage tests, the Court declared that “[t]he more relevant inquiry in evaluating 
severability is whether the statute will function in a manner consistent with the 
intent of Congress.”42 It thus introduced a third test, the intent test, which is 
easier to satisfy than the other two.  
Indeed, it is not clear why the first two tests are still needed. If the 
remaining provisions of a statute cannot function independently of the 
unconstitutional part, or if the legislature would not have passed it without the 
unconstitutional part, then a fortiori it would seem that the statute will not 
function as the legislature intended. The three tests also lack a unifying 
principle. Indeed they seem rather inconsistent. Should a court be focused on 
the language of the statute, as per the independence test, or on the intentions of 
the legislature, as per the other two? And if the latter, should the court look to 
what the legislature would have done had it known its law was partly invalid, 
or does the court instead decide on its own whether the severed law fulfills the 
legislature’s original goals? It seems strange to say both, much less all three. 
Yet that is where we are. 
This confusing doctrinal framework has failed to produce neutral principles 
that courts can apply in severability cases. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions seem largely determined by its views on the substantive merits of the 
partially invalidated laws. In cases where it considers severability questions at 
length, the Court’s deliberations resemble those of a legislative body. It 
considers what the law will look like without the unconstitutional part and 
determines whether the statute remains a good policy idea. It proceeded in this 
fashion well before the intent test announced in Alaska Airlines. For example, 
in two cases from the early 1920s—Hill v. Wallace and Board of Trade of 
Chicago v. Olsen—the Court considered whether two enforcement mechanisms 
for substantially identical laws regulating grain futures, respectively a penalty 
 
 42 480 U.S. at 685. 
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tax and the exclusion of transactions from interstate commerce, could be 
severed from the larger laws.43 The Court found that the tax could not be 
severed while the exclusion could, and it is difficult to find a principled ground 
for this distinction, aside from the fact that the Court approved of one law and 
not the other.44 Politicized decisionmaking of this sort is a feature of 
severability doctrine, not a bug. The Court inevitably puts itself in the place of 
the legislature and makes a policy judgment. To illustrate, consider three 
major, semi-recent opinions that addressed severability questions. 
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court employed policy-driven analysis in 
deciding to preserve portions of a major campaign finance law. The Court 
struck down several provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act on First 
Amendment grounds, including limits on independent expenditures and on 
candidates’ expenditures from their personal funds. In doing so, the Court 
severed the law’s public financing provisions and also implicitly severed the 
law’s campaign contribution limits.45 It recited the independence and 
hypothetical passage tests and concluded that the statute was severable because 
“[o]ur discussion of ‘what is left’ leaves no doubt that the value of public 
financing is not dependent on the existence of a generally applicable 
expenditure limit.”46 The Court thus relied on its approving analysis of the 
merits of the public financing provisions in finding them severable from the 
expenditure limits, exemplified by its statement that “[i]t cannot be gainsaid 
that public financing as a means of eliminating the improper influence of large 
private contributions furthers a significant governmental interest.”47 The crux 
of the analysis in Buckley was whether, in the Court’s judgment, the remainder 
of the law still worked well as a policy matter. 
In Booker, the Court engaged in a detailed policy debate over how to 
rewrite federal sentencing law. After the Court found the federal system of 
mandatory sentencing guidelines unconstitutional for violating the right to a 
jury trial, it then had to decide on the proper remedy.48 Justice Breyer’s 
 
 43 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 42 (1923); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 70 (1922). 
 44 See Stern, supra note 9, at 112 (“The two decisions on separability, written within eleven months of 
each other by the same judge, can be reconciled only on the ground that the Court approved of the substance of 
one statute and not of the other.”); see also id. at 109–14 (providing this and other examples of the Court 
making arbitrary, essentially legislative severability decisions in the early part of the twentieth century). 
 45 424 U.S. 1, 108–09 (1976) (per curiam). 
 46 Id. at 109. 
 47 Id. at 96. See generally id. at 90–109 (upholding the public financing provisions against various 
constitutional challenges). 
 48 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
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majority opinion determined that the best course was to strike down 
Section 3553(b)(1) of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), which had made the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines mandatory, with the result that the Guidelines 
are now advisory.49 Justice Stevens’s dissent argued instead that all facts 
leading to a higher sentence should need to be proven to a jury. Justice 
Breyer’s opinion argued that its remedial excisions could be severed from the 
rest of the statute, but that the dissent’s could not.50 In so arguing, the majority 
relied on a number of policy justifications: that the dissent’s remedy would 
increase sentencing disparities for similarly situated defendants, weaken the 
link between the sentence length and the offender’s real conduct, require more 
complex charging documents, make jury decisionmaking more difficult, render 
the plea bargaining process more arbitrary and disuniform, increase 
prosecutorial power, and leave sentences easier to shorten than to lengthen.51 
By contrast, the majority opinion defended its own remedy as essentially 
consistent with congressional intent because it left the basic structure of the 
SRA in place, and Congress likely would have preferred that to eliminating the 
Guidelines altogether.52 As in Buckley, it is clear from the opinion that the 
majority in Booker reasoned as a legislature, looking primarily to the policy 
consequences of each remedy when arguing about severability.53 
NFIB presents the most striking example of the Court basing severability 
decisions on policy reasoning. The majority opinion struck down a provision 
of the ACA conditioning state Medicaid funding on an expansion of Medicaid, 
and found that provision severable.54 The dissent, by contrast, found both the 
Medicaid expansion and the individual mandate unconstitutional, and 
determined that the entire ACA must fall along with them.55 The dissent’s 
 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 249 (“Several considerations convince us that, were the Court’s constitutional requirement added 
onto the Sentencing Act as currently written, the requirement would so transform the scheme that Congress 
created that Congress likely would not have intended the Act as so modified to stand.”); id. at 258 (“Although, 
as we have explained . . . we believe that Congress would have preferred the total invalidation of the statute to 
the dissenters’ remedial approach, we nevertheless do not believe that the entire statute must be invalidated.”). 
 51 Id. at 249–58. 
 52 Id. at 265 (“In our view, it is more consistent with Congress’ likely intent in enacting the Sentencing 
Reform Act (1) to preserve important elements of that system while severing and excising two provisions 
(§§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e)) than (2) to maintain all provisions of the Act and engraft today’s constitutional 
requirement onto that statutory scheme.”). 
 53 See Walsh, supra note 10, at 752 (“It should come as no surprise that the Court’s conclusion in Booker 
about what Congress would have wanted lines up closely with what five Justices think Congress should have 
wanted.”). 
 54 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012). 
 55 Id. at 2668 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).  
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analysis relied largely on policy arguments. It noted that “distinguished 
economists” had informed the Court that the $700 billion insurers would take 
in from the Medicaid expansion and individual mandate were necessary to 
offset $700 billion in new expenses that the ACA would impose on them, and 
that without this new revenue insurance premiums would rise.56 The dissenters 
also determined that hospitals would increase prices to make up for lost funds, 
and that government subsidies for the ACA’s insurance exchanges would have 
to increase if there were no individual mandate or Medicaid expansion.57 
Indeed, the dissent sometimes reads more like a policy brief than a judicial 
opinion, and the oral argument on severability often resembled a legislative 
committee hearing on insurance regulation.58 The dissent would also have 
struck down a number of totally ancillary provisions of the ACA—regulations 
for nursing mothers and tanning booths, a law requiring the display of 
nutritional information at restaurants, the extension of Medicare to people 
exposed to asbestos in Montana, and others—on the grounds that “[t]here is no 
reason to believe that Congress would have enacted them independently.”59 
This reverses the Court’s longstanding default rule—rather than presuming 
these items severable, the Court presumed them inseverable and required proof 
that they would have been passed independently.60 The dissenters in NFIB thus 
engaged in legislative-style decisionmaking, striking down functionally 
independent provisions and relying on economists for the proposition that a 
severed ACA would have adverse policy consequences.61 
The judicial legislating that these three decisions highlight is not just an 
occasional pathology of severability analysis—it is the mode of reasoning 
demanded by the official doctrine. The intent test announced in Alaska Airlines 
is the most transparently policy-driven of the three tests, because it asks courts 
to interpret Congress’s goals and use them as a basis for decision.62 Yet 
 
 56 Id. at 2672. 
 57 Id. at 2672–74. 
 58 See, e.g., Transcript, supra note 15, at 48–65. 
 59 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2675 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 60 One possible reason for this reversal is that the dissenters could not feasibly have gone through the 
ACA line by line to determine which of its many minor provisions could be preserved. See supra note 41. 
 61 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2672 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“The Court has been 
informed by distinguished economists that the Act’s Individual Mandate and Medicaid Expansion would each 
increase revenues to the insurance industry by about $350 billion over 10 years; that this combined figure of 
$700 billion is necessary to offset the approximately $700 billion in new costs to the insurance industry 
imposed by the Act’s insurance regulations and taxes; and that the new $700–billion burden would otherwise 
dwarf the industry’s current profit margin.”). 
 62 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987). 
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Congress’s “intent” in passing a law can often be characterized however a 
court chooses. For example, the NFIB dissenters characterized Congress’s 
intent as creating a system of “shared responsibility” and justified striking 
down the entire Act on the grounds that severing the two invalid provisions 
would disrupt this “sharing.”63 But one could just as easily characterize the 
ACA as serving any number of purposes—expanding health coverage, making 
health care less expensive, reining in abusive insurance company practices, and 
so on—and make severability decisions in light of the chosen end. And further, 
even where Congress’s intent is objectively clear, whether the severed law still 
furthers that intent is ultimately a legislative judgment. The hypothetical 
passage test at least gestures at external evidence, namely whether the 
legislature indicated that it would have passed the severed law. But such 
evidence is rarely if ever available, and so the hypothetical passage test 
collapses into an inquiry about the policy effects of severance—presumably 
Congress would not have passed the severed law if it had sufficiently bad 
consequences. The independence test is more amenable to neutral judicial 
standards of decision. One might determine whether the remaining provisions 
still have legal effect without making a policy judgment. But, in part because it 
is so narrow, the independence test is rarely the crux of the Court’s analysis, 
and it has been explicitly deemphasized in recent cases.64 The decisions where 
severability analysis is dominated by policy concerns are not flukes or 
bastardizations of the case law. The Court acts as a legislature because the 
doctrine demands it. 
II. THE DILEMMA: STATUTORY DISTORTION OR JUDICIAL LEGISLATING 
Inseverability responds to a peculiar kind of problem. A court that finds 
part of a law unconstitutional but keeps the rest in place will often leave behind 
a statutory scheme very different from what the legislature created. And much 
like removing lines of code from a computer program, eliminating parts of a 
statute can mutate the whole in undesirable ways. As the NFIB dissenters 
noted, severance “imposes on the Nation, by the Court’s decree, its own new 
statutory regime, consisting of policies, risks, and duties that Congress did not 
enact.”65 The search for a theory of inseverability is motivated by a desire to 
 
 63 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2671 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 64 See id. at 2668 (characterizing the independence test as merely a subsidiary part of the intent test); see 
also Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685 (“The independent operation of a statute in the absence of a 
legislative-veto provision thus could be said to indicate little about the intent of Congress regarding 
severability of the veto.”). 
 65 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2668 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
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give judges the power to alleviate this distortion problem. However, as just 
illustrated, the downside of having judges wield such power is that it causes 
them to invalidate statutory language that is perfectly constitutional, and to do 
so for purely policy reasons (as opposed to interpretive reasons, although that 
distinction is admittedly sometimes fuzzy). The challenge for this Article is 
thus to find a theory of inseverability that will allow judges to prevent statutory 
distortion while staying within their power to interpret the law. 
Many severability decisions do not distort the statutory scheme because the 
severed provision is basically autonomous from the rest of the law. In other 
words, the severed portion has no effect on anything else in the statute. These 
cases are generally easy to decide in favor of severance. In more difficult 
cases, however, removing part of a law will fundamentally change how that 
law functions. Consider again the opinions in Buckley, Booker, and NFIB. In 
Buckley, the Supreme Court struck down a ceiling on candidates’ spending on 
their own political campaigns but upheld a limit on third-party campaign 
donations.66 It thus created an asymmetric system that Congress never 
intended, where wealthy candidates can self-finance without limit, while 
poorer candidates face significant legal barriers to raising funds.67 In Booker, 
the Court severed the provision that made the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
mandatory.68 It thus transformed the Guidelines from a rule-bound code that 
judges were compelled to follow into a discretionary system of suggested 
sentences. While the Guidelines remain in place, they now function in a 
manner Congress never intended.69 In NFIB, if a majority of the Court had 
 
 66 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 67 This aspect of Buckley has been heavily criticized, including by Chief Justice Burger in his partial 
concurrence, and is cited as evidence that courts sever too frequently. See id. at 254–55 (Burger, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“All candidates can now spend freely; affluent candidates, after 
today, can spend their own money without limit; yet, contributions for the ordinary candidate are severely 
restricted in amount—and small contributors are deterred. I cannot believe that Congress would have enacted a 
statutory scheme containing such incongruous and inequitable provisions.”); see also Transcript, supra note 
15, at 84 (“[T]his Court in Buckley created a halfway house, and it took Congress 40 years to try to deal with 
the situation, when contrary to any time of their intent, they had to try to figure out what are we going to do 
when we’re stuck with this ban on contributions, but we can’t get at expenditures because the Court told us we 
couldn’t. . . . Why make them do that in health care?”); Campbell, supra note 13, at 1522 (“What no one 
proposed was a rule that would allow individuals who were wealthy to be able to spend their own money 
without limit, while individuals who were not wealthy were restricted, as a practical matter, to spending what 
they could raise, with limits on how much they could raise from any other person. Yet that is the system we 
now have, after the Supreme Court struck down the limit on individual expenditure, but left intact the rest of 
the statute regarding limits on fundraising.”). 
 68 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 69 Indeed, Congress had in prior years rejected other versions of the SRA that would have created more 
flexible sentencing systems. See id. at 293 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (“Congress explicitly rejected as a 
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found the individual mandate unconstitutional and severed it from the rest of 
the ACA, this would likely have caused a big rise in insurance premiums. 
Health insurers would have been compelled by the ACA to offer their products 
to consumers regardless of preexisting medical conditions, and consumers 
could thus have waited for an illness to strike before buying insurance. 
Congress contemplated and sought to avoid this adverse selection problem by 
creating the individual mandate, and the Obama administration even asked for 
the Supreme Court to hold the mandates on insurance companies inseverable, 
risking destruction of the heart of the ACA to avoid an ACA sans individual 
mandate.70 These three cases illustrate the basic problem of statutory 
distortion. When a law contains multiple parts that operate in concert, like an 
animal with four legs, severing one will fundamentally change how the law 
operates.71 
The purpose of severability doctrine is to lessen the harms of statutory 
distortion by giving courts the power to fix a partially invalidated law, either 
by removing additional parts or by striking the law down entirely. The problem 
is that, in exercising this power to declare statutes inseverable, a court finds 
itself reasoning and acting like a legislature. It does so in two senses. 
First, when a court finds a provision inseverable, it is invalidating statutory 
language. Such invalidation is a fundamentally legislative function. A court 
generally cannot erase part of a statute unless it is resolving a conflict between 
that statute and the higher law of the Constitution. Furthermore, inseverability 
 
model for reform the various proposals for advisory guidelines that had been introduced in past Congresses.”); 
Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 238 (1993). 
 70 See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (2012) (“[I]f there were no requirement, many individuals would wait to 
purchase health insurance until they needed care. By significantly increasing health insurance coverage, the 
requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will minimize this adverse selection and broaden 
the health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums.”); 
Brief for Respondents (Severability) at 13–14, 26, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Nos. 11-393 & 11-400), 
2012 WL 273133. 
 71 One might argue that a worse type of distortion occurs where a legislature enacts a rule with an 
exception, and the exception is held unconstitutional but the rule remains, so that the rule applies to cases the 
legislature never extended it to. For instance if the legislature passes a tax on “all persons who are not from 
Minnesota,” and the exclusion of Minnesotans is found unconstitutional, the legislature must then determine 
whether strike down the tax or the exception. However this is not, properly conceived, a problem of 
severability—it is, rather, a choice of how the court exercises its power of constitutional review. The court can 
remedy the constitutional violation by striking down either the exception or the rule. See Welsh v. United 
States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result) (“Where a statute is defective because of 
underinclusion there exist two remedial alternatives: a court may either declare it a nullity and order that its 
benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the 
statute to include those who are aggrieved by exclusion.”). 
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decisions sometimes skirt the Article III case or controversy requirement—
several Supreme Court justices have adopted the view that current doctrine lets 
them declare a statute inseverable even if there is no party with standing to 
challenge the entire law.72 The main task for a theory of inseverability, then, is 
to explain how the judiciary can exercise these legislative powers consistent 
with Article III of the Constitution. If it is to justify current practice, such a 
theory must show that a finding of partial unconstitutionality allows a court to 
rummage around in the rest of a law and strike out other parts too, and that the 
court may do so even if no party has standing to challenge those other parts. 
Second, even if we solve this theoretical problem of Article III power, 
courts in severability cases still often act like legislatures in a more normative 
sense. This is because judges rely on policy arguments (i.e. that a remaining 
provision is a bad idea without the invalidated provision, or that the legislature 
would not have wanted it to remain), as opposed to interpretive arguments (i.e. 
that a provision violates the Constitution), when they decide severability 
questions. This line between “policy” arguments and “interpretive” arguments 
is admittedly somewhat slippery in practice—a certain degree of purposive, 
policy-based reasoning may be inevitable in many interpretive contexts. But 
when judges decide severability questions under the current approach, there is 
nothing much to interpret—it is policy all the way down. As a former counsel 
to the House of Representatives put it, “[t]he Supreme Court decides what 
needs to be stricken for constitutional reasons, and then asks what else should 
be stricken for political reasons.”73 The prior Part illustrated how two of the 
Supreme Court’s main doctrinal tests—the intent test and the hypothetical 
passage test—require a reviewing court to determine severability on the basis 
of policy justifications. If courts are going to proceed in such a fashion, they 
may as well conduct legislative committee-style hearings to fully consider the 
consequences of severing a law. This would be unseemly, of course, because 
judges are not elected. Thus another desideratum of a theory of severability is 
that it should allow courts to depend on interpretive principles as opposed to 
pure policy arguments. This is not as crucial as finding an account of 
severability that is consistent with Article III, but it is surely important if we 
wish to preserve the legitimacy of the judicial function. 
 
 72 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2671 (Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“To be sure, an 
argument can be made that those portions of the Act that none of the parties has standing to challenge cannot 
be held nonseverable. The response to this argument is that our cases do not support it.”); see also, e.g., 
Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 278 U.S. 235, 242–44 (1929) (holding nonseverable statutory provisions 
that did not burden the parties). 
 73 Dorsey, supra note 10, at 880–81. 
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The current approach to severability presents a basic dilemma: judges must 
either distort the statutes they review, or they must exceed their Article III 
powers and reason like legislatures in fixing those statutes. An ideal theory of 
severability would let judges duck this unfortunate choice by achieving several 
things. It would allow judges to avoid statutory distortion, at least in some 
cases, by giving them the power to strike down perfectly constitutional 
portions of a statute. It would also account for how judges can exercise such a 
power consistent with Article III. Finally, it would provide judges with a way 
to base their reasoning on interpretive arguments rather than pure policy 
arguments. 
III. WHAT IS THE FUNDAMENTAL UNIT OF LEGISLATION? 
Before analyzing the various theories of severability, it is important to 
resolve an issue of metatheory: what is the fundamental unit of legislation for 
judicial review purposes? Or, more precisely, when a court conducts 
constitutional review of a law, what is the smallest unit of statutory language it 
can strike down—a word, a sentence, an entire statute, or something else? This 
Part will show that the correct answer is “a word.”74 That is, a court can 
remedy a violation of the Constitution by striking down a single word or a 
group of words, but it need not strike down the larger legislative unit (be it a 
section, statute, chapter, or title) that contains those words. Thus the normal 
framing of the severability question—where we ask if an unconstitutional 
provision “can be severed” from the rest of a statute—is exactly backwards.75 
The question is not “can we dislodge part of a statute without destroying the 
whole?” Rather, it is “once we have decided to remove one or more words of a 
statute to fix a constitutional problem, which other words can we also 
remove?” Two implications flow from this insight. First, any theory of 
inseverability must account for how the invalidation of some set of words 
permits a court to also invalidate other words. Second, any theory of 
 
 74 Here I am only discussing the remedy of invalidating words entirely. The courts may also use other 
constitutional remedies—such as interpreting a statute to avoid a constitutional problem or striking down 
unconstitutional applications of a statute—that leave the words of a statute intact but change their meaning. 
Such remedies are not relevant here. 
 75 See, e.g., Gans, supra note 11, at 653 (“For better or worse, courts need to have some power to save 
partially invalid legislation by severing the invalid portions and thereby reconstructing the statute.”). Here, I 
am only discussing how to frame the meta-question of courts’ power to sever statutes. It is of course possible 
that a particular doctrinal test will impose a presumption of severability and then require courts to ask how a 
provision can be “saved.” But that is distinct from assuming that any time a court engages in judicial review it 
initially strikes down the entire statute, and that it then “saves” or “reconstructs” parts of the statute by 
severing the unconstitutional part. 
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inseverability must account for the larger unit of legislation within which 
severability analysis occurs—whether it be a “bill” that Congress passes at a 
single moment, or an “act” that is codified at a specific place in the legislative 
code and that has been amended over time. 
Dean Tom Campbell argues that the fundamental unit of legislation is a 
bill. Thus when a court strikes down part of a law, it automatically “renders 
void the entire bill of which that unconstitutional provision was a part.”76 
Campbell argues from this premise that courts should never engage in 
severability analysis.77 And his reasoning is quite valid. If we accept that the 
fundamental unit of legislation is a single bill enacted by Congress at one point 
in time, and that a court is unable to invalidate any smaller unit, then the 
concept of “severability” is nonsensical. A court cannot strike down an entire 
law and then reenact parts of it. If striking down part of a law entails striking 
down the whole, it follows that statutes cannot be severed and must be 
accepted or rejected in toto. 
The main problem with Campbell’s approach is that it forces us to accept 
some untenable results. Any invalidation of even the smallest part of a law 
would require a court to destroy the entire law.78 Thus in Marbury v. Madison 
the Supreme Court would have been forced to invalidate the Judiciary Act of 
1789. In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board,79 the Court would have had to destroy the entire Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
The decision in INS v. Chadha would have required the total invalidation of 
196 different federal laws that contained legislative veto provisions.80 And 
consider Booker. The Sentencing Reform Act was enacted in 1984 as part of 
an omnibus bill, the “Act of October 12, 1984.”81 This bill enacted an 
 
 76 Campbell, supra note 13, at 1496. 
 77 Id. at 1497–98. 
 78 One might imagine a variant of Campbell’s approach in which bills are treated as inseverable units 
unless they contain a severability clause, and those that do have such a clause are treated as severable. This 
would let Congress reverse the default rule of inseverability. The likely effect of such an approach would be 
that Congress would include pro forma severability clauses in every statute, as it does in many statutes now. 
See YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. 97–589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
AND RECENT TRENDS 38 (2008), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf. Thus, the courts would 
end up treating most laws as severable, and the problems discussed in this Part would arise only if Congress 
forgets to include a severability clause (or consciously decides not to include one). 
 79 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
 80 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (“Since 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted into law, 295 
congressional veto-type procedures have been inserted in 196 different statutes . . . .” (quoting James 
Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative 
Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323, 324 (1977) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 81 Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–2040. 
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estimated 450 pages of statutory text (comprising roughly 25% of all the 
statutory text enacted by Congress in 1984),82 and it did dozens of different 
things, including funding most of the federal government,83 authorizing federal 
agencies to contract with local governments for firefighting services, requiring 
a federal statistics office to combine St. Louis into a single statistical area, 
providing grants to strengthen state and local law enforcement, eliminating 
parole, making it harder to establish an insanity defense, and so on.84 Under 
Campbell’s approach Booker’s invalidation of Section 3553(b)(1) of the 
Sentencing Reform Act would require undoing everything in this massive bill, 
including billions of dollars in appropriations that were spent decades ago. It 
would overburden Congress to force it to periodically reenact such massive 
laws, and given the realities of partisanship and legislative inertia, such 
reenactments could take a long time or even not happen at all. If judges were 
forced to choose in this way between leaving small constitutional violations 
unremedied and destroying entire bills, they would likely uphold statutes as a 
matter of course simply to avoid such major disruptions. Perversely, the 
Supreme Court would exercise even more power under such a theory, because 
it could use the certiorari process to decide whether or not to hear a 
constitutional challenge to a small part of a statute (and, consequently, destroy 
the entire statute). And no law would ever be safe—for example any successful 
challenge to a single tiny provision of the Affordable Care Act, whether 
brought today or in several decades, would fundamentally transform the 
American health care system. Campbell’s approach would thus turn judicial 
review from a scalpel into a wrecking ball. 
One might respond that these are merely pragmatic concerns and that 
Campbell’s approach is required for formalist reasons. In other words 
legislation is simply indivisible, consequences be damned. This assertion runs 
against centuries of practice in the United States—the Supreme Court has 
treated laws as severable since at least Marbury, and Congress often explicitly 
makes laws severable through severability clauses.85 Thus we would have to 
 
 82 Dorsey, supra note 10, at 882 (explaining that in addition to the text of the Act reported in the United 
States Statutes at Large, the Act also enacted dozens of provisions by reference). 
 83 Id. at 883–84 (citing § 101, 98 Stat. at 1837, 1844, 1867–77, 1884, 1904). 
 84 See id. at 881–83. 
 85 See KIM, supra note 78, at 38. Canada, by contrast, treated statutes as inseverable until the 1980s. See 
KENT ROACH, CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES IN CANADA 14-1 (2014) (“Historically, legislation in Canada that 
violated the federal division of powers was struck down in its entirety.”). However Canada has in the last few 
decades begun finding statutes severable, largely due to their increased complexity and the resulting problems 
from invalidating them in toto. 
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believe that bills are indivisible even though Congress and the courts do not 
believe or intend them to be. This could only be achieved by constructing a 
constitutional metaphysics of statutes in which a bill is an atom of law that 
cannot be divided. One could do so by interpreting bicameralism and 
presentment to make bills into unbreakable units, but the features of the 
legislative process do not compel that interpretation.86 Certainly Congress can 
repeal parts of an enacted bill without needing to repeal and replace the entire 
bill. Why, then, must a court that strikes down part of a bill also strike down 
the entire thing? Laws are human artifacts, and it is transcendental nonsense to 
argue that they are a priori indivisible even though Congress and the courts 
understand them to be divisible, and even though making them indivisible 
leads to perverse consequences.87 
So we must reject the view that a bill is the fundamental unit of legislation. 
Most of the other potential units can be dismissed with little discussion. It 
cannot be the act, chapter, or title that contains the invalid provision, nor can it 
be the entire legislative code—those options would mandate similarly 
problematic results. And to say that a “section” of a law is the fundamental unit 
of legislation is to again rely on a false formalism. Congress commonly does 
many independent things in the same section of a law, and the internal 
structure of legislation is often just a product of arbitrary organizational 
decisions or path dependence (e.g. the permutation of amendments and the 
order in which they were adopted).88 No, the fundamental unit of legislation 
must be a unit of natural language. Letting a court strike down a single 
morpheme would blur the line between deleting language and rewriting it—
surely a court could not remove the “fe” from “female” or the “re” from 
“resentencing.” However there are cases where a court can strike down a single 
word without rewriting the law. This could happen if a law contains a list of 
 
 86 In defending his formalism, Campbell draws an analogy to the line-item veto: the President cannot 
choose which parts of a bill he vetoes, and so the courts cannot choose which parts of a bill they strike down. 
Campbell, supra note 13, at 1498–99. But this analogy does not hold. The line-item veto is invalid because the 
Presentment Clause requires that the President accept or reject a bill in toto during its passage, not because 
bills are inherently indivisible once Congress approves them. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 
439–41 (1998). Judges can strike down part of an enacted bill without affecting the rest of it, just as Congress 
can repeal part of an enacted bill while leaving the rest in place. 
 87 See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 
(1935). 
 88 See Stern, supra note 9, at 110 (“[A]s far back as 1855 it had been wisely recognized that ‘the point is 
not whether they are contained in the same section, for the distribution into sections is purely artificial; but 
whether they are essentially and inseparably connected in substance.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 
71 Mass. (5 Gray) 482, 486 (1855))). 
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items, and only one of those items is unconstitutional. In the sentence “a 
person shall not be eligible to join the military if they are under eighteen years 
of age, nearsighted, female, or overweight,” the word “female” could be taken 
out without changing the meaning of what remains.89 Of course this is an 
unusual example—in most cases the court will have to strike out more than just 
one word in order to avoid rewriting the statute or making nonsense of it. For 
instance, a court could not strike out the word “not” or the word “military” in 
the above example, at least not without making further excisions from the 
statute. Thus the fundamental unit of legislation for judicial review purposes is 
the word, but in most cases a court will have to strike down a group of 
words—a phrase, a sentence, or some larger unit—in order to avoid rewriting 
or making nonsense of the statute.90 
The main task for a theory of inseverability, then, is to explain why striking 
down one group of words means that the court can also strike down another. 
Whenever a court finds a statute unconstitutional, it must determine which 
words it will invalidate in order to bring that statute into line with the 
Constitution. Often the choice will be obvious, but sometimes the court has 
some discretion—for example where it can strike down either the exception or 
the rule (as in an otherwise constitutional tax that is not applied to females),91 
or in complex cases where several different excisions could remedy the 
constitutional problem (as in Booker).92 In this first phase, the court cannot 
 
 89 See, e.g., Noble v. Mitchell, 164 U.S. 367, 369, 372 (1896) (treating as binding the Alabama Supreme 
Court’s severance of the words “association or partnership” from the statutory sentence “[t]he term ‘insurance 
company,’ as used in this article, includes every company, corporation, association or partnership organized 
for the purpose of transacting the business of insurance”). 
 90 In some cases, the Supreme Court has struck down a unit smaller than a sentence. See Stern, supra 
note 9, at 110 n.152. 
 91 See supra note 71. 
 92 Some scholars have argued that declaring a statute partly unconstitutional does not involve any act of 
excision by the reviewing court, but that the court is merely recognizing that the Constitution automatically 
“displaced” the problematic language. See Tribe, supra note 10, at 25; Walsh, supra note 10, at 778–84. This 
theory supposedly shows that there is no judicial power to find a statute inseverable because a judge that 
strikes down an unconstitutional provision has not actually changed anything: the statute was already partially 
invalid the moment it was enacted because the unconstitutional part was never real law, and the judge is 
merely recognizing that fact. This theory fails for two reasons. First, the Constitution does not strike down 
statutes—judges do. Making a statute consistent with the Constitution inevitably requires judges to exercise 
discretion when they excise language. Sometimes a judge has to choose between striking down an exception or 
a rule, or in complex cases like Booker, has to choose between two different excisions that would each solve 
the constitutional problem. In other kinds of cases, the judge has to choose between striking down the 
provision altogether or merely interpreting it to exclude an application. And even in cases where it is clear 
which statutory language must go, courts still exercise other sorts of remedial discretion, such as deciding 
whether to delay the remedy or to make it retroactive. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line 
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1982) (finding federal bankruptcy courts unconstitutional, but staying the judgment). 
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strike down more words than necessary to render the statute constitutional.93 In 
the second phase, after the constitutional violation has been remedied, the court 
takes a second look at the statute and determines what word or group of words, 
if any, to strike out on inseverability grounds. A theory of inseverability must 
explain how judges can go from phase one to phase two—that is, it must 
explain how after remedying the constitutional violation by excising some 
words, the court can then go on to excise further words in order to limit 
statutory distortion. 
A theory of inseverability must also account for the larger statutory unit 
within which words’ fates can be tied together. That is, it must address the 
question “where else in the legislative code should a court look to find 
inseverable language?” There are several possible answers.94 One would 
simply let a court look anywhere in the code for legislative language that is 
inseverable from the stricken words (the Code approach). A second would let a 
court look only at other provisions that were enacted as part of the same bill 
(the Bill approach). A third would let a court look only at other provisions that 
are part of the same uninterrupted sequence of language in the code, which is 
designated as a single “act” and has been amended over time (the Act 
approach). To see the difference between the Bill approach and the Act 
approach, consider the Voting Rights Act (VRA).95 The VRA is codified in 
Title 52 of the United States Code in Sections 10101 through 10702. The first 
VRA bill was enacted in 1965, and among other provisions it contained 
Section 2, which prohibited discriminatory voting laws, and Section 5, which 
required several states to obtain permission before changing any election 
 
Thus a reviewing court does not just passively recognize that the Constitution “displaced” part of a statute the 
moment the statute was passed. The court actively edits the statute to craft a solution to the constitutional 
problem. Second, even if we assume that the Constitution “displaces” the invalid parts of a statute such that 
they were never valid in the first place, inseverability questions still arise. It does not matter whether the 
language was removed through automatic “displacement” or through judicially managed excision—the statute 
is distorted either way. To make the case that there is no power to declare statutes inseverable one must 
grapple with the theories presented in Parts IV and V of this Article, each of which provides a possible account 
for why a judge that has found one provision unconstitutional can then find other provisions inseverable. The 
claim that judicial review is a passive activity does not refute any of these theories—judges could still have a 
remedial or interpretive power to fix statutory distortion after they recognize a constitutional “displacement.”  
 93 The Supreme Court has recognized this principle. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) 
(plurality opinion) (“A ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the 
people. Therefore, a court should refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary. As this Court 
has observed, ‘whenever an act of Congress contains unobjectionable provisions separable from those found to 
be unconstitutional, it is the duty of this court to so declare, and to maintain the act in so far as it is valid.’” 
(quoting El Paso & Ne. Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909))).  
 94 See Dorf, supra note 12, at 370. 
 95 52 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101–10702 (West 2014). 
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procedures.96 The second VRA bill was enacted in 1970, and it reenacted 
Section 5, as well as adding a number of other provisions, including one that 
lowered the national voting age to eighteen.97 The Supreme Court then struck 
down this voting age provision in Oregon v. Mitchell.98 So the question is, 
what provisions might the Court have found inseverable in Oregon v. Mitchell? 
Under the Bill approach, it could only have looked at other parts of the bill 
enacting the 1970 VRA amendments (including any non-VRA provisions, had 
it been an omnibus bill). Under the Act approach, it could have looked at any 
provisions of the VRA as codified in Title 52, including those that had been 
enacted in the 1965 bill. Under the Code approach, it could have looked 
anywhere in the legislative code. None of these three approaches is necessarily 
correct a priori—to determine what assumptions make each valid, we must 
flesh out the various theories of inseverability and explore their logics. 
IV. THREE THEORIES OF SEVERABILITY 
Judges do not have a freestanding authority to delete language from 
statutes. To justify the practice of inseverability, we must somehow explain 
why the power of constitutional review carries with it the power to excise 
further language. This Part will explore three possible explanations: (1) That 
judges have a remedial power in equity to edit the legislative code in order to 
correct for the statutory distortion caused by judicial review, (2) That 
inseverability is an exercise in hypothetical intent-based statutory 
interpretation, where judges vindicate the legislature’s goals by deleting parts 
of the statute’s text, and (3) That laws are akin to contracts between legislators, 
and inseverability is a way for judges to enforce the terms of a legislative 
bargain. As shall be seen, none of these three theories is a plausible account of 
inseverability for federal courts. 
A. Equitable Remedy 
In A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, Guido Calabresi argues that 
judges should have a general power to update laws that have become 
obsolete.99 Calabresi reasons that since legislative inertia prevents many laws 
from keeping up with the times, courts ought to step in and either eliminate 
 
 96 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 2, 5, 79 Stat. 437, 437, 439. 
 97 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, §§ 5, 6, 84 Stat. 314, 315–19; see 
also Eric S. Fish, Note, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment Enforcement Power, 121 YALE L.J. 1168, 1183 (2012). 
 98 400 U.S. 112, 117–18, 130–31 (1970). 
 99 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2 (1982). 
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anachronistic laws or change their meanings.100 One possible theory of 
inseverability would follow a similar logic. In order to remedy statutory 
distortion, which arises when judges strike down part of a statute, judges 
would be granted a remedial power to delete other legislative language to 
correct the problem.101 This remedial deletion power might stem from judges’ 
inherent common law authority, or it might be delegated by the legislature. The 
power would also be discretionary, much like equitable remedies in civil cases. 
Thus, for example, after striking down the individual mandate in NFIB, the 
Court would have had the discretion to rummage through the remainder of the 
ACA and determine which other provisions ought to be struck down, and 
which preserved, based on the Court’s vision of the best version of the statute 
sans mandate. This theory would take the power to invalidate language in order 
to make a statute constitutional, and add to it a power to invalidate further 
language in order to make a statute sensible as a policy matter. 
It is difficult to see limits to a remedial inseverability power. When courts 
exercised it they would be acting as essentially legislative bodies, combing 
through a statute and deciding which provisions to strike down for policy 
reasons. The Supreme Court could articulate standards to govern these cases, 
or elaborate a set of tests to create a common law of severability remedies. The 
most natural touchstone for such tests would be the purposes of the statute as 
defined by the legislature. But that approach would only do so much to limit 
judicial discretion; since each severability case is very different, the Court 
could modify or reinterpret the doctrine as new situations arose, and 
Congress’s goals are often subject to multiple characterizations. It is also 
difficult to see any potential limit to the unit of legislation that a court could 
strike down. The logic of this theory does not point to either the Bill approach 
or the Act approach, and unless a limit is borrowed from some other theory, 
the proper unit of analysis would seem to be the entire code. Thus, for 
example, a court operating under this theory might cure the damage caused by 
striking down the individual mandate in NFIB by also striking down the age 
limit on Medicare, solving the adverse selection problem by creating a 
single-payer health care system. Further, it is not clear why courts would have 
to stop at striking down other provisions. If courts have a remedial power to 
delete additional language for policy reasons, why could they not also add 
 
 100 Calabresi equivocates, however, on the question whether such a power currently exists. See id. at 116–
17. 
 101 David Gans has advocated such a theory, arguing that inseverability is a matter of judicial remedial 
discretion. See Gans, supra note 11, at 656–62. 
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language to salvage a partly invalid law?102 This intuitively seems like a more 
extreme exercise of legislative power by courts. But in a world where courts 
have the general authority to delete statutory language for policy reasons, it is 
difficult to articulate a principled reason for denying them this further power. 
The equitable remedy theory is not a plausible account of inseverability, 
given the limited nature of federal judicial power. Federal judges cannot act 
without an explicit grant of jurisdiction;103 they cannot answer political 
questions that are ill-suited to judicial resolution or are more properly decided 
by a coordinate branch of government;104 they cannot do anything without a 
properly presented case or controversy;105 and they are supposed to exercise 
restraint in constitutional review cases and defer to the elected branches of 
government.106 These limitations cannot be squared with a general power to 
invalidate legislative language for policy reasons, even if that power is only 
exercised to avoid statutory distortion. The equitable remedy theory would 
further pose a counter-majoritarian problem—federal judges lack the 
democratic legitimacy to reshape laws in such a fashion. And unlike in the 
context of judicial review, findings of inseverability do not vindicate 
constitutional rights.107 When a court strikes part of a law down, it does not 
become a legislature. Such a power has no basis in federal courts’ inherent 
common law authority, because it would involve changing statutes rather than 
changing judicially created doctrines. It is also difficult to defend the equitable 
remedy theory as an implied delegation—the ability to delete statutory 
language as a remedy is a massive amount of power to grant federal judges 
without mentioning it, and Congress’s frequent pro forma use of severability 
clauses suggests some antipathy to declarations of inseverability.108 The theory 
might be more plausible if Congress were to enact a law explicitly granting 
 
 102 See Glenn Chatmas Smith, From Unnecessary Surgery to Plastic Surgery: A New Approach to the 
Legislative Veto Severability Cases, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 397, 463–66 (1987) (arguing that courts in 
severability cases have the power to reformulate the language of partly unconstitutional laws, and not just to 
strike language down); cf. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (exemplifying a case in which the 
Supreme Court remedied a constitutionally underinclusive statute by effectively adding language to the 
statute). 
 103 E.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). 
 104 E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 105 E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992). 
 106 E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) 
(“We begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged statute is valid.”). 
 107 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986). 
 108 KIM, supra note 78, at 38 (“Congress frequently includes a pro forma severability clause in a 
statute . . . .”).  
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federal courts the power to strike down additional statutory language so as to 
avert the negative consequences of partial unconstitutionality.109 But such a 
grant would raise nondelegation issues, and it would be difficult for courts to 
exercise this delegated power within the limits of Article III.110 In any event, 
Congress has not granted the courts such a power, and it cannot be inferred 
from the general power of constitutional review. 
B. Hypothetical Legislative Intent 
A second theory would treat severability as a statutory interpretation 
problem. Under this theory, a court would decide a severability case by 
determining which provisions the legislature would hypothetically have 
wanted invalidated had it known that part of the statute was unconstitutional. 
The court would then strike down those provisions. It would do so on the 
theory that every statute without an explicit severability or inseverability 
clause contains implied instructions with respect to severability, and that the 
court can determine what those instructions are by looking to the legislature’s 
goals. Thus severability questions are treated as interpretive lacunae, akin to 
vague phrases or other ambiguities, and are filled in by looking at legislative 
intent. This approach allows courts to avoid statutory distortion by doing what 
the legislature would have preferred in light of its goals.111 Thus, for example, 
in NFIB the Supreme Court might have determined that striking down the 
individual mandate but leaving the rest of the ACA in place would be 
inconsistent with Congress’s goals, as it would lead to higher premiums or 
potentially drive insurance companies out of business. And under this theory 
the Court would not be making that decision of its own authority, it would 
simply be interpreting Congress’s handiwork in light of the enactors’ 
intentions. 
 
 109 For example Kentucky has enacted a statute instructing courts how to resolve severability questions, 
although that statute frames the issue as one of legislative intent rather than remedial power. See KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 446.090 (West 2006). 
 110 Cf. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) (striking down a law empowering the 
president to issue line-item vetoes); CALABRESI, supra note 99, at 114–16 (arguing that his theory of a 
common law for statutes could be achieved through legislative delegation to courts). It would be especially 
difficult to exercise this broad remedial power within the constraints of the case and controversy requirement, 
since the court would need a party with standing to request whatever remedy the court found appropriate. 
 111 In contrast, some scholars call for a “textualist approach” to severability. See, e.g., Movsesian, supra 
note 10, at 73–82. But textualism cannot provide an account of why some statutory language might be 
inseverable from other language, aside from the obvious case of an explicit inseverability clause. Thus to take 
a strict “textualist” approach to severability questions would basically mean finding everything severable. I do 
not explore a “textualist” theory here because the premises of textualism are consistent with the conditionality 
theory presented in Part V. 
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This is the theory most compatible with the Supreme Court’s current 
severability doctrine. Both the hypothetical passage test and the intent test 
follow naturally from it. Indeed, if one adopts this theory, those two doctrinal 
tests become basically two versions of the same question. In asking whether 
Congress would have passed the law with the unconstitutional part severed, 
one is also asking whether the law still functions in the manner that Congress 
intended. The hypothetical intent theory also seems to follow from the 
Supreme Court’s statements about severability. The Court has declared that 
legislative intent is the key to its severability decisions, noting in the NFIB 
majority opinion that “[w]e seek to determine what Congress would have 
intended in light of the Court’s constitutional holding”112 and that “[o]ur 
‘touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative intent, for a court 
cannot use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.’”113 
While the Court employs a default presumption that Congress intends 
provisions to be severable, this default can be overcome where severance 
would distort the statute in ways that Congress would not have wanted. 
The major problem with this theory is that, in most cases, a court cannot 
determine Congress’s intent with respect to severability. Except in the rare 
case where Congress includes explicit inseverability instructions in the statute 
(i.e. an inseverability clause) or makes its intentions clear in the legislative 
history, a court will necessarily be putting itself in Congress’s place and 
imagining whether Congress would have wanted to keep the remainder of the 
statute. The hypothetical intent theory thus devolves into imaginative 
reconstruction.114 Rather than looking to the specific intentions of the 
legislature, which are not generally available, courts must look to the general 
purposes of the statute and decide whether, given those purposes, Congress 
would have preferred other parts of the statute to fall alongside the 
unconstitutional provision. This leads to situations where a judge must go 
through a statute provision by provision and decide what stays or goes based 
on the legislature’s assumed preferences. And most complex statutes have 
 
 112 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220, 246 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 113 Id. (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006)). 
 114 See Walsh, supra note 10, at 752–53 (“The hypothetical legislative intent test gets around this absence 
of any actual legislative intent to discern but does so by posing a question whose answer often calls for rank 
speculation. The inquiry can perhaps be given some content by reference to legislative purpose, or to the 
‘enterprise’ to which the statute belongs. But it can easily deteriorate into a question of what ought to happen, 
in which case ‘legislative intent’ adds nothing.” (citing and quoting Emily L. Sherwin, Rules and Judicial 
Review, 6 LEGAL THEORY 299, 305 (2000)) (some internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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many conflicting purposes, so that a judge can emphasize one or the other 
when deciding what to invalidate. This “picking your friends out of a crowd” 
problem is minimal when a purposivist judge uses a statute’s goals to resolve 
interpretive ambiguities, because the judge is restrained by the statute’s text, 
and the purpose only works as a kind of tiebreaker between plausible 
interpretations.115 But the problem is much worse when a judge uses the 
statute’s purpose to override and delete parts of the text. Indeed there is a 
crucial difference between using the legislative purpose to resolve an 
ambiguity and using the legislative purpose to slash and burn your way 
through a statute. The hypothetical intent approach effectively makes a court a 
kind of replacement Congress, telling judges to get into the heads of legislators 
and decide what they would have wanted to repeal. 
Consider the Affordable Care Act—it had many different goals, including 
reducing the cost of health care, expanding coverage, reining in insurance 
company abuses, and more. As Chief Justice Roberts noted at the oral 
argument in NFIB: 
[S]traight from the title, we have two complementary purposes, 
patient protection and affordable care. And you can’t look at 
something and say this promotes affordable care; therefore, it’s 
consistent with Congress’s intent. Because Congress had a balanced 
intent. You can’t look at another provision and say this promotes 
patient protection without asking if it’s affordable.  
So, it seems to me if you ask what is going to promote Congress’s 
purpose, that’s just an inquiry that you can’t carry out.116 
The existence of so many competing purposes means that a court can justify 
any severability result it wishes by construing Congress’s goals a particular 
way. Nor does this problem disappear when Congress has one clear overriding 
purpose—the court must still determine for itself whether the excision so 
undermines that purpose as to make the remainder of the law 
counterproductive. Consider the Federal Election Campaign Act, which had a 
fairly clear purpose—fighting corruption in politics by putting limits on 
fundraising and expenditures. If invalidating part of the law makes the goal 
harder to achieve (as in Buckley), the court still has to decide whether the 
remainder of the law is desirable in light of the goal. And the court has to 
 
 115 The argument I am making here is not intended as a general broadside against intentionalist or 
purposivist methods of statutory interpretation, but only against the use of hypothetical intent and statutory 
purpose to declare provisions inseverable. 
 116 Transcript, supra note 15, at 51–52. 
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balance the policy considerations on its own, because there is no way of 
knowing what Congress would hypothetically have done had it known that part 
of its bill was unconstitutional. It could have passed another version of the bill 
with a replacement provision, the bill minus the unconstitutional provision, no 
bill at all, or a totally different bill. The legislative history will not reveal 
which of these Congress would have done—even if Congress considered and 
rejected a version of the bill without the unconstitutional part (as happened 
with prior versions of the Sentencing Reform Act),117 there is no way of 
knowing whether Congress would have passed that version had it known about 
the constitutional problem. A court cannot know what Congress’s decision 
would have been in a counterfactual world. Thus a court is forced to put itself 
in Congress’s place and do the policy weighing itself. 
A further problem is that this theory of inseverability cannot be treated as 
merely an exercise in statutory interpretation. If it is to be justified at all, it 
must be by invoking some form of inherent judicial remedial power, akin to 
the equitable remedy theory discussed in section A. When a court finds a 
statute inseverable under the intent theory it is not interpreting a vague phrase 
in the statute or filling in any sort of gap. It is enacting judicially created 
fallback law by taking Congress’s purposes and using them to trump the actual 
text of the statute.118 This is amending the text, not interpreting the text. To 
justify such an inseverability power, one would have to embrace a theory akin 
to the English principle of “equity of the statute”—that judges have an inherent 
authority to extend a statute beyond its text, or to create exceptions not present 
in the text, when doing so would advance the statute’s purpose.119 This would 
transform the hypothetical intent theory from an interpretive theory into a 
remedial theory. And much as with the equitable remedy theory, it means that 
we must posit an inherent judicial authority to change the content of statutes in 
order to remedy statutory distortion. 
The hypothetical intent theory of inseverability also, if taken on its face, 
entails further judicial powers that are not plausible. If courts have a power to 
interpret Congress’s general purposes as creating implied inseverability 
 
 117 See supra note 69. 
 118 See Dorf, supra note 12 (discussing legislatively created fallback law).  
 119 See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001) 
(“The most important alternative justification for atextual and purposive interpretation relates to an ancient 
common law doctrine: the equity of the statute. As discussed below, when applied, that doctrine authorized 
courts to extend a clear statute to reach omitted cases that fell within its ratio or purpose, and conversely, to 
imply exceptions to such a statute when the text would inflict harsh results that did not serve the statutory 
purpose.”). 
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clauses, there is no principled way to limit this power to provisions within a 
single legislative bill or act. If Congress passes a law in time A, then passes a 
number of separate laws that assume or rely on that first law in time B, and 
then the first law is held unconstitutional in time C, the court could strike down 
or rewrite the laws passed in time B. Take the War Powers Resolution. Ten 
years elapsed between the enactment of the WPR and the decision in INS v. 
Chadha,120 which had the effect of invalidating the WPR’s legislative veto 
provision. In those ten years, Congress enacted numerous laws financing and 
regulating the armed forces, providing for new weapons systems, and affecting 
our relations with other nations, all under the assumption that if the President 
sent troops into foreign combat then Congress would be able to withdraw 
them. After INS v. Chadha, the hypothetical intent theory would let a court 
rummage through each of those defense laws and delete the parts of them it 
thinks Congress would have intended to delete had Congress known about its 
diminished war powers. There is also no good reason to limit such a power to 
constitutional review cases. Why can’t judges invalidate legislative language 
whenever any event undermines Congress’s intended purpose? If the courts 
can delete parts of a statute in order to preserve Congress’s intentions after a 
partial invalidation, they could well do the same when dealing with any other 
intervening events that cause a statute to no longer serve its intended 
function.121 And why stop at deletion? The English principle of equity of the 
statute permitted courts to actually add to statutes, extending them to new 
circumstances or creating exceptions when doing so would serve the law’s 
goals.122 If a court can use intentionalist reasoning to delete language from a 
statute, it is hard to see why it could not create judicial amendments in the 
same fashion. This is all to say that while the hypothetical intent theory of 
severability may seem modest at first, its premises entail granting the judiciary 
very broad powers to reshape a statute’s text so as to better achieve Congress’s 
ends. 
On examination, then, the hypothetical intent theory is indistinguishable 
from the inherent judicial power theory. They start from different premises but 
end up looking the same in practice. Both theories must posit a power to delete 
statutory language once part of a law is declared unconstitutional, and both 
theories require judges to rely on non-interpretive policy arguments when 
 
 120 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 121 This would bring us quite close to Calabresi’s theory in A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF 
STATUTES—courts would be able to invalidate statutes when events have made them anachronistic. See 
CALABRESI, supra note 99. 
 122 See Manning, supra note 119, at 22. 
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exercising such power. Invoking the hypothetical intentions of the legislature 
to delete parts of its text cannot be passed off as merely an act of interpretation. 
If it is to be justified at all, it must be as a judicially created remedy to the 
problem of statutory distortion. And Congress’s general intentions with regard 
to a partially unconstitutional statute will not give a court much guidance 
concerning what else Congress would have deleted. Thus, when deciding what 
to make inseverable, courts must produce their own policy decisions. And this 
theory cannot be limited to severability cases, but would give courts the power 
to declare statutory provisions invalid whenever an intervening event thwarts 
Congress’s intentions. The hypothetical intent theory is therefore implausible 
for the same reasons as the inherent judicial power theory. Both are 
inconsistent with the limited nature of judicial authority in our constitutional 
tradition. 
C. Legislative Contract Remedy 
A third theory would draw an analogy to contract law.123 Enforcing private 
contracts is a classic judicial power, and legislation might be seen as a form of 
contract. Legislators debate and compromise with one another when 
determining the language of a statute, and the judiciary can play a role in 
preserving these compromises. On this account, judges would only exercise a 
remedial power to declare statutes inseverable when doing so preserves the 
terms of the legislative bargain. If legislators trade provision A for provision B 
in a single bill, and a court subsequently finds A unconstitutional, it can also 
invalidate B on the grounds that leaving B in place would unfairly burden the 
legislators who negotiated for A. The court would do so on analogy to the 
doctrine that contracts can be rescinded if part of the contract is void on public 
policy grounds.124 Judges would thus provide legislators with a guarantee that 
the deals they make in the legislative process will not be later undone through 
constitutional review. The NFIB dissenters seemed to endorse a version of this 
theory when they declared that the dozens of minor provisions in the ACA, 
many of which were included as “quid pro quos” to induce legislators to 
support the law, should be found inseverable.125 
 
 123 See, e.g., Movsesian, supra note 10 (noting and arguing against the treatment of statutes as contracts 
for severability purposes). 
 124 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 cmt. a (1981). 
 125 See 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2675–76 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“Often, a 
minor provision will be the price paid for support of a major provision. So, if the major provision were 
unconstitutional, Congress would not have passed the minor one. . . . Some provisions, such as requiring chain 
restaurants to display nutritional content, appear likely to operate as Congress intended, but they fail the 
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The contract remedy account of inseverability relies on a common intuition 
about legislation—that it is enacted as a bundle of deals, not as many 
individual parts, and that much like a private contract it cannot be partially 
undone without changing the nature of the whole. This theory calls for the Bill 
approach, since the relevant unit of legislation would necessarily be a single 
enactment that Congress agrees to at one point in time.126 Of course, two 
provisions of the same bill might be totally unrelated and grouped together 
merely for convenience (as in omnibus legislation). But such cases are easy to 
deal with—a court would simply find the independent parts of such bills 
severable absent some indication that they were traded for one another. It is 
also not difficult to limit the contract theory to the text of the bill in question, 
excluding side deals between legislators. This could be done by analogy to the 
parol evidence rule: if legislators are unwilling to put their agreements in the 
language of the statute, then they cannot use contract remedies in the courts.127 
This both simplifies the task of determining what is in the legislative contract 
and limits the enforcement of corrupt legislative deals by the courts (by 
excluding those that legislators are unwilling to memorialize in a statute). The 
Bill approach does create the curious result that subsequent amendments to an 
act cannot be declared inseverable—thus, for example, if the ACA had been 
amended after its initial passage, the Court would be unable to strike down the 
 
second test for severability. There is no reason to believe that Congress would have enacted them 
independently.”). 
 126 It would be absurd to analogize an act to a contract, since acts are modified by different Congresses 
that have different compositions. For instance, the Voting Rights Act was enacted in 1965 and amended in 
1970, 1975, 1982, 1992, and 2006. GEORGE P. LANEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. 95-896, THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, AS AMENDED: ITS HISTORY AND CURRENT ISSUES (2008), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/109556.pdf. The current VRA, which reflects all of these 
successive amendments, cannot meaningfully be treated as a single legislative agreement. A closer question 
would arise if two bills—one establishing an “Act” and the second amending the same “Act”—were passed in 
the same session of Congress, or alternatively if two separate bills were passed simultaneously as part of a 
single legislative agreement. But this is not a terribly important point to the legislative contract theory, and 
could be resolved either way. If courts adopted either possible rule (either that different laws enacted in the 
same Congress can be part of the same agreement, or that they cannot), then legislators would be able to plan 
their legislative bargains accordingly. 
 127 A potentially more interesting case would arise if the President made a guarantee to a crucial group of 
legislators that he would enact certain regulations if they voted for a law. For example, during the passage of 
the ACA a group of pro-life Democrats in the House of Representatives agreed to support the law only if 
President Obama promised to issue an executive order that would limit the use of federal funds for abortion. 
See Monica Davey, Under Fire for Abortion Deal, Stupak to Retire, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, at A16, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/10/us/politics/10stupak.html. Given the fact that any important 
regulations could have been included in the statute itself, it would be sensible to avoid making such 
negotiated-for regulations part of the judicially preserved legislative contract. Including executive action 
would blur the distinction between laws and regulations, creating an odd situation where if a court finds a 
regulation invalid it may also have to invalidate a statute.  
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amendments as inseverable from the individual mandate. But that problem is 
not fatal, it just limits the scope of the inseverability power in potentially odd 
ways. The contract theory also carries the considerable benefit that it avoids 
the problem of judicial legislating. It does not call on courts to make judgments 
of policy, but instead to analyze a statute’s text and enactment history in order 
to determine the contours of any deals made between the legislators. Such 
agreements may sometimes be difficult to divine from the legislative history,128 
but that is simply a problem of implementation. Courts could apply a default 
rule favoring severability, and only let that default be overcome if the 
legislative history reveals that an unconstitutional provision was traded for one 
or more other provisions in the bargaining process. 
This theory of legislative contract remedies has much to recommend it. It 
facilitates the legislative process by guaranteeing to legislators that the terms of 
their deals will be enforced. Further, it removes any incentive for legislators to 
make compromises with the hope that the federal courts will bail them out of 
their concessions by declaring them unconstitutional. Unfortunately, however, 
it is not a convincing account of the inseverability power. This is so for two 
reasons. 
First, legislative contract remedies do not solve the problem of statutory 
distortion because the operational parts of a law are not generally traded for 
one another. Rather, they are crafted to work together to advance Congress’s 
policy goals. Many compromises certainly happen while determining what 
those goals are and how the statute should pursue them, but it does not follow 
that the main provisions of a statute are consideration for one another. 
Consider a few familiar examples. In the campaign finance statute at issue in 
Buckley, the limits on fundraising and the limits on expenditures were not 
parallel concessions—they were complementary regulations that Congress 
packaged together. The same is true of the ACA—the individual mandate was 
not traded for the other main provisions of the ACA, such as the requirement 
that health insurers cover everybody that applies; rather, they were all enacted 
as a comprehensive system with multiple parts. This is also true of the 
Sentencing Reform Act—the provision making the Guidelines mandatory was 
not exchanged for some other provision, it was part of the enactors’ overall 
plan for an administrative sentencing system. While private contracts involve 
 
 128 See Movsesian, supra note 10, at 71–72 (noting that it may be difficult to find evidence of a legislative 
contract in cases where legislators do not express their disagreements or engage in the key negotiations on the 
record). 
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each party promising to perform some act or omission in exchange for an act 
or omission by the counterparty (e.g. “Party A agrees to satisfy all the lumber 
needs of Party B in exchange for one thousand dollars per month”), the core 
components of legislative agreements do not formalize an interparty exchange 
of one benefit for another. Rather, legislative agreements create legal 
frameworks that confer rights and obligations on third parties, who are the 
objects of the legislation. A final bill is certainly the result of dozens of 
micro-bargains that happen throughout the committee process and floor 
debates, during which alternative statutory designs are considered and rejected, 
and plenty of horse trading takes place.129 But these bargains are akin to 
negotiations between two co-authors over what their article will look like—
there are debates and creative compromises, but only infrequently is there an 
explicit quid pro quo over the basic argument or structure of the article. 
Contract rescission does not give us the conceptual tools to deal with classic 
inseverability problems because a group of legislators rarely receives a 
windfall or loses the benefit of their bargain when an integral part of a statute 
is removed. 
Second, to the extent that there are quid pro quo deals in the legislative 
process, these generally take the form of adding provisions to a bill in order to 
gain votes. This means that the contract remedies approach would create a 
strange version of severability. The key argument in any severability decision 
would not be “provisions X and Y are necessary for one another to function 
properly,” but rather “a crucial group of legislators would not have supported 
this bill without provision X.” Thus the only relevant test would be a strong 
version of the hypothetical passage test, and courts would decide severability 
cases by essentially doing a whip count. Rather than considering whether 
excising a provision distorts the operation of a statute, courts would have to 
look at whether the excision would have prevented passage of the bill. For 
example, during the debate over the ACA, Senator Ben Nelson traded his 
crucial support for roughly $100 million in Medicaid funding for Nebraska—
 
 129 See Dorsey, supra note 10, at 879 (“A statute is not the result of a legislative bargain. A statute is the 
product of a convergence of microbargains, between and among 100 senators, 435 representatives, and the 
White House. Tradeoffs are made within a single legislative provision, sure, but tradeoffs are also made across 
the various legislative provisions in a single bill. And tradeoffs are also made between this legislative 
provision and that funding provision, between this provision and that decision to do something or to refrain 
from doing something else, between this bill and that bill, between this bill and that hearing, and between this 
bill and that nomination. There are people who feel confident they can pore over the statute or the legislative 
history and identify the legislative bargain. They may also be confident they can pore over a sonar image from 
the depths of Loch Ness and identify the plesiosaur. I agree there are dark shapes in the water but that’s as far 
as I will go.”). 
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the so-called “cornhusker kickback.”130 So if this provision were struck down 
on constitutional grounds, presumably the entire ACA would have to fall 
alongside it.131 And there were dozens of other provisions that were likely 
added to the ACA to secure votes for its passage—it would be strange indeed 
if the entire law had to fall because any one of these was struck down.132 One 
could try and avoid this outcome by imposing a substantiality requirement, 
such that only “major” provisions lead to legislative contract rescission. But 
this would be a difficult distinction to draw, and would not change the basic 
problem. Rather than tracking the substantive logic of the statute, severability 
doctrine would depend on finding agreements over specific provisions. It also 
follows that the only available remedy is to invalidate the entire bill, since 
provisions like the cornhusker kickback generate legislative support for the 
overall package and are not tied to any other specific provision. Thus 
inseverability would function as a wrecking ball rather than a scalpel—courts 
would not be able to find one single provision inseverable from another single 
provision, but would have to choose between severing a provision and striking 
down the entire bill. The contract remedy theory is thus not a plausible account 
of inseverability, because it tracks the logic of legislative dealmaking rather 
than the substantive internal logic of a statute.133 
We might also imagine a variant of this contract remedies theory. Rather 
than focusing on the existence of specific quid pro quos during the legislative 
 
 130 See Chris Frates, Payoffs for States Get Harry Reid to 60 Votes, POLITICO (Dec. 19, 2009, 7:56 PM 
EST), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/30815.html. 
 131 Justice Scalia made this precise point at oral argument in Sebelius. See Transcript, supra note 15, at 10 
(“JUSTICE SCALIA: All right. The consequence of your proposition, would Congress have enacted it without 
this provision, okay, that’s the consequence. That would mean that if we struck down nothing in this 
legislation but the—what is it called—the ‘Corn Husker kickback,’ okay, we find that to violate the 
constitutional proscription of venality, okay? (Laughter.) JUSTICE SCALIA: When we strike that down, it’s 
clear that Congress would not have passed it without that. It was—it was the means of getting the last 
necessary vote in the Senate. And you’re telling us that the whole statute would fall because the Cornhusker 
kickback is bad. That can’t be right.”). 
 132 See id. at 27 (“CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The reality of the passage—I mean, this was a piece of 
legislation which, there was—had to be a concerted effort to gather enough votes so that it could be passed. 
And I suspect with a lot of these miscellaneous provisions that Justice Breyer was talking about, that was the 
price of a vote: Put in the Indian health care provision and I will vote for the other 2700 pages. Put in the black 
lung provision, and I’ll go along with it. That’s why all—many of these provisions, I think, were put in, not 
because they were unobjectionable. So, presumably, what Congress would have done is they wouldn’t have 
been able to put together, cobble together the votes to get it through.”). 
 133 It is possible that bargained-for treaties, which in a sense are both laws and contracts, might sometimes 
be treated as contracts for severability purposes. See generally Curtis J. Mahoney, Note, Treaties as Contracts: 
Textualism, Contract Theory, and the Interpretation of Treaties, 116 YALE L.J. 824 (2007) (arguing that 
relational contract theory should govern treaty interpretation). 
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bargaining process, we could treat severability analysis as a form of 
contractual gap filling. Just as courts in contract cases look to the goals of the 
drafters when filling in incomplete contracts, courts in severability cases could 
look to the goals of the drafters when determining how to respond to an event 
that the drafters did not anticipate (such as partial invalidation of the law).134 
And by analogy to contract law, this might be done by disaggregating the 
intentions of the different actors who maintain legislative veto-gates and trying 
to determine what fix each of them would have consented to had they been 
informed during the drafting process that the bill was partly unconstitutional.135 
This variant contract remedies theory need not be analyzed here, because it is 
indistinguishable from the hypothetical intent theory addressed in the prior 
section.136 Just like this contract theory variant, the hypothetical intent theory 
relies on judicial recognition of Congress’s hypothetical intentions to motivate 
reshaping a statute that has been partially invalidated.137 
V. SEVERABILITY AS LEGISLATIVE CONDITIONALITY 
A. The Theory 
Having rejected the three theories that might justify an expansive approach 
to inseverability, it is time to consider a narrower one: legislative 
conditionality. The legislative conditionality theory would make inseverability 
a simple problem of statutory interpretation. It would instruct courts to decide 
inseverability issues by looking at whether the legislature made part of a 
statute conditional on the continued validity of another part. Generally 
legislatures have the power to enact conditional legislation, making a provision 
operative or inoperative once a triggering event occurs.138 Thus a legislature 
 
 134 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Incomplete Contracts and Statutes, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 257, 257 
(1992). 
 135 See McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 
80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992) (arguing for such an approach to statutory interpretation). 
 136 See supra Part IV.B. 
 137 Unfortunately, the analogy to contract law does not provide much help in locating congressional intent. 
See Hadfield, supra note 134, at 257–58 (“We will be disappointed, therefore, if we look to incomplete 
contracting principles in hope of avoiding the morass of ‘intent.’ Indeed, if we imported the standard 
gap-filling analysis from contracting into the statutory interpretation arena, we would still run smack into 
Arrow’s theorem: in the legislative case there is simply no answer to the gap-filling counterfactual, ‘what 
would the parties have voted for?’”). 
 138 Michael Dorf has argued that such conditional legislation could be unconstitutional if it is used to 
coerce the courts into not exercising their constitutional review powers. For example, if Congress created a 
fallback law that eliminated school lunches if the Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act, he 
argues that that would be unconstitutionally coercive. See Dorf, supra note 12, at 327–29, 333–36; 
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could create explicit fallback law through an inseverability clause—a clause 
establishing that if provision A is held unconstitutional, then provision B is no 
longer valid law. But legislatures can also create such fallback law 
implicitly.139 They can do so in three ways: by writing a statute so that its 
language no longer makes sense without the excised part, by writing a statute 
so that one part cannot be enforced if another part is excised, or by enacting a 
provision that serves no purpose without another provision.140 For example, the 
sentence “the Sentencing Commission shall have exclusive authority to enact 
sentencing guidelines” is implicitly conditional on the existence of a body 
called the “Sentencing Commission.” If a court strikes down the provision 
creating that body,141 then this statutory language becomes nonsense. 
Similarly, if Congress enacts a law creating a crime, and then a separate law 
providing the sentence for that crime, the sentencing provision is implicitly 
conditional on the crime provision. If the crime is invalidated, then the 
sentencing provision cannot have independent effect even though its syntax 
still makes sense. Finally, even if a provision is textually coherent and 
independently enforceable without the excised provision, it can still be 
implicitly conditional if it no longer serves any plausible purpose. For example 
if a statute provides for regulation of gasoline prices and also for the collection 
 
see also Kameny, supra note 12; cf. Bruce K. Miller, Constitutional Remedies for Underinclusive Statutes: A 
Critical Appraisal of Heckler v. Mathews, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (1985). This argument is appealing 
but ultimately not convincing. Congress has the power to enact punitive legislation if it likes, so long as it stays 
within the limits set by the Constitution. Congress cannot cut judicial pay or limit judicial tenure, but it can 
certainly enact bad laws to punish the judiciary, and it can design those laws to take effect only after a 
triggering event. Nothing in the Constitution protects any of the three branches from bullying. If Congress 
wants to steal lunch money because the judiciary struck down a law, that is Congress’s prerogative. As a 
practical matter, though, it seems unlikely that a legislature would actually create such a punitive fallback law. 
And if it did, it would almost certainly repeal the law once the triggering condition was satisfied in order to 
avoid an electoral backlash. The public would rightly blame Congress, not the courts, for their kids going 
hungry. It is also worth noting that policy blackmail is not limited to Congress. See CALABRESI, supra note 99, 
at 269–70 (describing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), as a failed attempt at judicial blackmail of Congress). 
 139 A number of scholars have adopted the view that courts should find everything severable unless there 
is an explicit inseverability clause. See supra note 10. However none of these have explored the possibility of 
implicit inseverability. 
 140 Rachel Ezzell has made a similar proposal, arguing that a statute should be held inseverable only 
(1) when there is an explicit inseverability clause or (2) when the severed law could not logically be enforced. 
See Ezzell, supra note 10. The legislative conditionality approach would add to these (3) when statutory 
language is inseverable as a consequence of its syntactic logic and (4) when one provision serves no purpose 
without another. 
 141 Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that the 
Sentencing Commission is unconstitutional on nondelegation grounds). 
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of data solely to assist that regulation, the data collection could be found 
conditional on the ability to regulate.142 
When a court finds a provision implicitly conditional, it engages in a type 
of statutory interpretation. Since it cannot find an explicit inseverability clause 
in the text of the statute, it looks instead to the logical relationship between the 
statute’s provisions to see if one is necessarily implied. This is quite similar to 
two other interpretive doctrines: implied repeal and conflict preemption. When 
a court finds a law repealed by implication, it concludes that the legislature 
repealed the law without saying so. A court can make such a finding only in 
situations where there is a “plain repugnancy” between the two provisions, 
such that they cannot both be given full effect without creating a 
contradiction.143 Similarly, when a court finds a state law preempted by a 
federal law through the doctrine of implied conflict preemption, it concludes 
that Congress preempted the state law without acknowledging having done so. 
A court finds such preemption in situations where it is “impossible for a 
private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.”144 Under 
both of these doctrines, members of Congress might not have known that by 
enacting a law they were repealing or preempting anything, but the law is still 
properly interpreted as including the repeal or preemption because that is the 
only sensible reading. Implied conditionality follows the same logic. Even if 
Congress did not enact an inseverability clause, courts can infer one where 
removing legislative language will render a statute meaningless or incoherent. 
The legislative conditionality theory is similar to the hypothetical intent 
theory discussed above, since both treat severability as a feature of statutory 
interpretation. However, there is an important distinction between them. The 
legislative conditionality theory calls for interpretation of a statute, rather than 
imaginative reconstruction of a statute. It looks at whether the statutory 
remainder remains logically coherent with the unconstitutional provision 
severed, rather than at what Congress might hypothetically have wanted if that 
provision were invalidated. When a court decides whether two provisions are 
implicitly conditional on one another, it looks at the texts and purposes of the 
respective provisions and determines whether they depend on each other 
 
 142 See Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (striking down a law fixing gas prices 
and finding inseverable provisions creating a state agency to administer the price fixing). 
 143 Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975) (finding that the Securities Exchange Act impliedly 
repeals the antitrust laws insofar as they regulate securities transactions). 
 144 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 899 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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within the architectural logic of the statute. It asks questions concerning the 
statute’s internal design—does provision X make syntactic sense without 
provision Y? Can X be enforced without Y? Does X still serve any purpose 
without Y? However the court does not, as in the hypothetical intent theory, 
ask whether severing Y but leaving X in place will better serve Congress’s 
legislative goals. The court thus engages in a narrower, more “interpretive” 
inquiry that is focused on the internal architecture of the statute and how its 
pieces fit together, and not on the policy consequences of partial invalidation. 
Similar to the implied repeal doctrine, the court only concludes that two 
provisions are implicitly conditional when it would be either impossible or 
plainly illogical to preserve one provision without the other. It does not find 
implied conditionality merely to avoid negative consequences where the 
provisions are functionally independent. 
Legislative conditionality thus has one major downside: it gives courts 
limited tools to deal with the problem of statutory distortion. This is because, 
unlike with the hypothetical intent theory, courts cannot strike down legislative 
language for non-interpretive policy reasons. If the Supreme Court had struck 
down the individual mandate in NFIB and applied the conditionality theory, 
the severability inquiry would have been a simple one. All of the other 
operative provisions of the Affordable Care Act were both syntactically 
coherent and capable of being enforced without the individual mandate, and 
they still served a purpose without the mandate.145 Thus the rest of the ACA 
would have remained in place, notwithstanding the facts that insurance 
premiums would have gone up or that health insurers may have gone bankrupt. 
Similarly, the restrictions on campaign donations in the Federal Election 
Campaign Act were neither explicitly nor implicitly conditional on the 
expenditure restrictions struck down in Buckley.146 Thus, under the 
conditionality theory, the Buckley Court got the severability question right. It is 
not the Court’s role to strike down additional provisions for pure policy 
reasons. If such broken statutes are going to be fixed, Congress must do the 
mending. 
However, legislative conditionality is the only theory of inseverability that 
is ultimately defensible in the federal judiciary. Unlike the hypothetical intent 
and equitable remedy theories, it does not require positing an implausibly 
broad power to strike down statutory language. And unlike the contract 
 
 145 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18121 (2012). 
 146 See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3. 
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remedies theory, it does not turn legislative deals into agreements enforceable 
in court. Instead it infers that Congress made certain statutory provisions 
inseverable from others, and shows that the courts’ job is simply to interpret 
statutes correctly so as to find out which language is conditioned on which 
other language. This theory also avoids making courts approach severability 
questions like legislatures. Rather than considering the policy justifications for 
deleting additional language, courts look to the language and internal logic of a 
statute and identify implicit or explicit inseverability instructions. And while 
legislative conditionality cannot fix all instances where severing language 
creates undesirable policy outcomes, it still lets courts avoid situations where 
severing a provision makes other statutory language ineffectual or incoherent. 
It is thus at least better than the contract remedy theory, which only lets courts 
enforce the terms of legislative deals. While legislative conditionality is 
certainly not a perfect theory, it is the most plausible account of the 
inseverability power in the federal system. Its details and implications will be 
explored further in the following sections. 
B. Finding Conditionality 
Legislative conditionality is found through the normal process of statutory 
interpretation. Thus, when judges search for conditionality they explore the 
kinds of evidence that determine a statute’s meaning—text, legislative history, 
purpose, and so forth. Here we will consider the different circumstances under 
which a judge could find legislative conditionality. We will consider seven 
kinds of cases: (1) where there is an explicit inseverability clause; (2) where 
there is no inseverability clause, but the legislative history shows an intention 
to make part of the statue conditional; (3) where severing language would 
leave the text incoherent; (4) where severing language would leave part of the 
statute incapable of being given effect; (5) where part of the statute serves no 
purpose once another part is severed; (6) where severing part of the statute 
changes the statute’s overall effect in an undesirable way; and (7) where there 
is implicit conditionality, but the statute contains an express severability 
clause. 
The easiest case is a statute containing a clear inseverability clause, a 
clause that instructs judges to strike down provision Y if provision X is held 
unconstitutional.147 If a law specifically instructs that the invalidation of one 
 
 147 See, e.g., Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 334(g)(3), 91 Stat. 1509, 1547 
(“If any provision of this subsection . . . is held invalid . . . the application of this subsection to any other 
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provision causes others to lose their force, then judges must follow that 
instruction and find the provisions inseverable. This follows from the premise 
that inseverability is a legislative power and not a judicial one. A legislature 
can enact a law that takes effect or sunsets after some triggering condition, and 
a judicial finding of unconstitutionality could be one such condition. Some 
scholars have argued that inseverability clauses are unconstitutional because 
they tell judges how to construe statutes, which encroaches on the powers of 
the judiciary.148 But this is backwards. Inseverability clauses are not 
instructions for how to interpret a statute; they are substantive provisions with 
their own binding force. And making statutes inseverable is not a judicial 
power; it is a legislative power the exercise of which sometimes requires 
judicial interpretation. 
The situation is somewhat more complicated if the legislature does not 
write an explicit inseverability clause, but makes it clear in the legislative 
history that it means for one provision to be conditional on another. For 
example, imagine that a statute’s text is silent on inseverability, but the main 
committee report states that “provision A serves no purpose without 
provision B, and if provision B were invalidated we would like provision A 
struck down as well.” A judge’s approach in such a case will necessarily 
reflect that judge’s theory of statutory interpretation. A textualist in the mode 
of Justice Scalia or Judge Easterbrook would not find the legislative history 
relevant and so would not count it in favor of inseverability. But a judge with a 
more intentionalist orientation might use the legislative history to find implied 
inseverability. It should be noted, however, that an intentionalist judge would 
need to find evidence that Congress actually intended to make one provision 
conditional on the other, that is, that it meant one to fall if the other fell. 
Evidence that Congress meant the two provisions to work in concert, or that it 
thought that one would not function well without the other, is insufficient by 
itself to establish such conditionality. 
Courts can also find implied conditionality as a function of a statute’s 
syntax, where severing language would render a provision either meaningless 
or absurd. This type of conditionality is not a product of the legislature’s 
 
persons or circumstances shall also be considered invalid.”); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) 
(reviewing an Alaska statute that provided “If any provision enacted in sec. 2 of this Act . . . is held to be 
invalid by the final judgment, decision or order of a court of competent jurisdiction, then that provision is 
nonseverable, and all provisions enacted in sec. 2 of this Act are invalid and of no force or effect” (quoting 
1980 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 21, § 4, at 9) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 148 See Dorsey, supra note 10, at 892; see also Kameny, supra note 12, at 999–1000, 1009. 
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conscious intentions—it is a feature of the nature of written language. Parts of 
a sentence are often necessary to the whole, and so when we speak in sentences 
we sometimes create unbreakable units of meaning. The sentence “Emily’s 
puppy will get all the treats” makes no sense if Emily has no puppy. Similarly, 
the sentence “bankruptcy courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such 
actions” makes no sense if the Supreme Court has made bankruptcy courts 
unconstitutional. This principle of syntactic conditionality sometimes holds 
even if the reformed sentence still makes sense after an excision, if it gives the 
sentence an accidental new meaning. For example, the sentence “there shall 
never be more than one hundred female students enrolled at the U.S. Naval 
Academy” is unconstitutional gender discrimination, but a court cannot 
remedy it by striking out only the word “female.” That would leave us with a 
totally accidental meaning, limiting the size of the Academy to 100 students, 
which is absurd in light of the statute’s purpose. Thus the entire sentence is 
implicitly conditional on the word “female.”149 If one strikes down that word, 
the rest of the sentence must go with it.  
This concept of syntactic conditionality helps us make sense of a kind of 
severability that this Article has not yet dealt with—severable applications. 
When a statutory provision has many applications, some of them constitutional 
and some not, a court must decide whether to strike the provision down 
entirely or sever the unconstitutional applications. For example, in Northern 
Pipeline v. Marathon Pipe Line the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts 
could not hear state law contract claims, and found the rest of bankruptcy 
courts’ jurisdiction inseverable in part because all of bankruptcy jurisdiction 
was provided by a single statutory sentence: 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b), providing 
jurisdiction for “all civil proceedings arising under title 11.”150 Under the 
principle of textual conditionality, the Court’s basis for finding this sentence 
facially invalid would be that the sentence becomes nonsense if its main 
applications are taken out. The sentence is implicitly conditional on its main 
applications, and the result in the case would be different if the bankruptcy 
code contained two separate textual grants of jurisdiction—one for state 
common law claims and the other for all other claims. Consider another 
example. If a law provides that “civil rights will be protected throughout the 
 
 149 This principle also helps explain why courts never strike down fragments of words, for example the 
prefix “fe” in “female.” Words are implicitly indivisible, such that each part of a word is conditional on each 
other part. See supra Part III (discussing why courts cannot strike down single morphemes); see also Noble v. 
Mitchell, 164 U.S. 367, 372 (1896). 
 150 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982), invalidated by N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 
U.S. 50 (1982).  
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United States,” but the Supreme Court determines that the statute is invalid as 
applied to the fifty states and the territories, it might also strike down the 
statute as applied to American flagged ships.151 In doing so, the Court would 
be determining that the phrase “throughout the United States” becomes 
nonsensical if it is only applied to conduct on a few boats. But a separate 
sentence specifically providing for civil rights on ships would have been 
severable. Textually implied conditionality thus might help make sense of the 
facial versus as-applied distinction in at least some cases.152 
A similar but distinct category of implied conditionality consists of cases 
where one statutory provision cannot be given legal effect without another. 
This kind of case is captured by the Supreme Court’s independence test—a 
provision is inseverable unless “standing alone, legal effect can be given to 
it.”153 One example of such a provision would be an appropriation for an 
unconstitutional enactment. If Congress passes a law to build an 
unconstitutional structure (say a statue of Moses to be placed in the national 
mall), and then separately enacts a law appropriating funds for that structure, 
the funds are conditional on the structure. Money cannot be spent on 
something unless that thing is permitted to happen, and thus a court can 
reasonably conclude that the appropriation is conditional on the other 
enactment. Similarly, if a tax is held unconstitutional, any provisions for the 
collection of that tax could be struck down as well. And if a law creating a 
crime is held unconstitutional, a separate sentencing statute cannot remain 
valid. A similar finding of implied conditionality might be made where a 
provision can have no legal effect after the larger statutory structure that 
contains it has been invalidated. So for example, if the Supreme Court were to 
strike down the Sentencing Reform Act and its entire Guidelines structure, any 
separate statute creating specific Guidelines rules would also have to go. Those 
rules could have no independent legal effect without the larger structure, so if 
they remained they would be free-floating enactments without any context or 
force.154 Even if judges could not find provisions inseverable for lack of 
 
 151 See Butts v. Merchs. & Miners Transp. Co., 230 U.S. 126, 138 (1913) (holding that the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875, which had been invalidated as applied within the states, was also invalid as to United States 
vessels engaged in coastal trade). 
 152 See generally Dorf, supra note 11, at 251–83 (showing that the Supreme Court often makes statutory 
applications inseverable from one another, notwithstanding the principle announced in Salerno v. United 
States, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), that applications are presumptively severable). 
 153 Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924). 
 154 See Stern, supra note 9, at 76 n.1 (“In theory, a legislative body has power to enact laws or parts of 
laws which are incapable of being given legal effect. Accordingly, if a legislative body should for some or no 
reason desire that an ineffectual or meaningless part of a law stand alone, the legislative intention should 
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independence, such provisions would still not have any legal consequence 
since they could not meaningfully be enforced. They would essentially be 
deadwood—filler for the legislative code. But there is no meaningful 
distinction between a court recognizing a provision as deadwood and the court 
striking that provision down.155 Thus, when a court recognizes that a provision 
cannot have legal effect without the invalidated provision, the court is 
necessarily declaring those two provisions inseverable and striking them down 
together. 
Implied conditionality might also be found where a remaining provision no 
longer serves any plausible purpose. Even if a provision makes syntactic sense 
and can be enforced without the excised language, a court could potentially 
find it invalid because it no longer has any function.156 Consider again the 
statue of Moses on the national mall, which would violate the Establishment 
Clause. If Congress had a separate provision that created a wooden pedestal for 
the statue (the pedestal would, let’s stipulate, lack any religious symbolism), 
that provision could be found conditional on the validity of the statue. The 
pedestal provision might make perfect textual sense, and the pedestal might 
logically still be built without a statue atop it, but the pedestal is so clearly 
intended only to support the statue that a court could reasonably conclude 
Congress intended the one to be conditional on the other. In doing so the court 
would not be imposing its own policy judgment about whether the pedestal is 
still desirable, but merely determining whether the pedestal has any 
independent function in the statute. The Supreme Court case Williams v. 
Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana involved precisely this kind of inseverability.157 
 
prevail. But the fact that valid provisions of a statute are incapable of having legal effect by themselves is 
ordinarily conclusive proof that the legislature did not intend them to stand by themselves. Legislatures do not 
pass laws merely to increase the size of the statute books. Inasmuch as the same results are reached under 
either theory, the difference in approach has no substantial significance and will not be considered further 
here.”). 
 155 When a court strikes down statutory language, it does not actually delete that language from the code. 
Only the legislature can do that. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 700 (2012) (establishing criminal penalties for defacing 
the American flag), invalidated by United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1992). When a court strikes a 
provision down, this is only a declaration that it has no legal effect. Hence there is no difference between a 
judge striking a provision down and a judge finding that a provision is deadwood. In both cases the judge is 
declaring that the provision will no longer have any legal effect, but is leaving its language in place. And in 
both cases, if the provision’s unconstitutionality is cured (say by a constitutional amendment), then the 
provision becomes valid again even if it is not reenacted. 
 156 See 2 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 44:4, at 576 
(6th ed. 2001) (“Even where part of an act is independent and valid, other parts which are not themselves 
substantively invalid but have no separate function to perform independent of the invalid portions of the act are 
also held invalid.”). 
 157 278 U.S. 235 (1929). 
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Tennessee had created an agency to fix gasoline prices, and the Supreme Court 
determined that this price regulation was unconstitutional. However the agency 
was also empowered to do other tasks, such as collecting data that were 
intended solely for the purpose of helping it fix gas prices. The Court found 
these other functions inseverable because they were “mere adjuncts of the 
price-fixing provisions of the law or mere aids to their effective execution.”158 
Such provisions are like a barnacle going down with a ship. Finding implied 
conditionality in such a case does require looking at the purposes of the statute 
(e.g. to regulate gas prices, or construct a statue), and not just at its text. As a 
consequence, this kind of implied conditionality seems perilously close to an 
inquiry into hypothetical congressional intent. To avoid that danger, it must be 
limited to only clear cases—cases where conditionality can be inferred from 
the fact that a provision plainly serves no other function. If there is a valid 
argument that the legislature intended the provision to serve an independent 
purpose, then a court cannot find it implicitly conditional. By doing so the 
court would go beyond interpreting the internal logic of the statute, and would 
instead be looking at Congress’s hypothetical preferences.159 
The conditionality theory does not permit courts to find provisions 
inseverable merely on the grounds that leaving them in place would create 
adverse policy consequences or that it would frustrate legislative intent. The 
approach is therefore incompatible with the intent test and the hypothetical 
passage test, and is generally a weak tool for dealing with statutory distortion. 
There is no defensible basis for interpreting the ACA to find the mandates on 
insurance companies (much less the entire Act) conditional on the individual 
mandate. Congress enacted two clearly separate provisions—a requirement 
that individuals buy health insurance and a requirement that insurers sell their 
products without regard for preexisting conditions. These provisions make 
textual sense without one another, can each be enforced without the other, and 
 
 158 Id. at 243. 
 159 There may be borderline cases. For example, in Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana one might 
argue that the data-collecting agency also serves an academic research function for professors with an interest 
in oil prices, even though there is probably little evidence of such a purpose in the statute’s text or legislative 
history (and it seems like an expensive way to generate data for professors). In deciding whether the data 
collection provision is conditional on the rest of the statute, judges would have to determine whether 
legislators actually had that independent purpose in mind when they enacted the statute. Such an inquiry would 
be similar in structure to a Title VII case, where one party claims that they were fired for discriminatory 
reasons and the other party must show an independent rationale for the firing. Here one party claims that 
provision A exists only to assist the (now unconstitutional) provision B, and the other party must show an 
independent justification for A. This inquiry is much more narrow than the hypothetical passage test, which 
asks whether the legislature (given its substantive policy preferences) would have enacted B without A. 
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would each serve a plausible purpose even if the other were no longer in effect. 
The mere fact that Congress might not hypothetically have wanted one without 
the other is insufficient to find them conditional. The same is true of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act. Eliminating the restrictions on campaign 
expenditures may create major problems for that statute, and may even make it 
undesirable as a matter of policy, but that is insufficient evidence for a court to 
find the remainder of the statute conditional on the excised provisions. Courts 
may only find laws conditional if they can reasonably be interpreted as 
containing legislative instructions to eliminate one provision if another falls. 
A final issue to consider is what legislative conditionality means for 
severability clauses. Under current doctrine severability clauses are largely 
irrelevant because such clauses only establish a presumption of severability, 
and there is already a default presumption favoring severability in all cases 
regardless of whether there is such a clause.160 Under the conditionality 
approach severability clauses would also ordinarily be surplusage, since this 
approach finds statutes inseverable only in a very limited set of cases. Thus 
such clauses would affect a court’s decision in only a few kinds of 
circumstances. A severability clause would presumably overcome any 
legislative history suggesting that parts of the statute were conditional on one 
another, unless a judge believed that legislative history could trump the plain 
text. A more interesting question is how such clauses interact with implied 
conditionality. In the first two kinds of cases—where severing leaves the 
remainder of the statute textually incoherent or incapable of being enforced—it 
is difficult to see how a severability clause could be followed. Severability 
clauses are generally not applied to specific statutory text, but communicate a 
general legislative intention that pieces of the statute be treated as severable.161 
That intention could be defeated in any particular case if severance would 
 
 160 Severability clauses are officially understood to create a presumption favoring severability. See Alaska 
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987). However the absence of such a clause does not reverse the 
presumption favoring severability. See id. Rather, a presumption of severability operates in every case 
regardless of whether there is a severability clause. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653 (1984) 
(plurality opinion). It is not clear from current doctrine whether the default presumption is as easily overcome 
as the presumption created by a severability clause. 
 161 See Max Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388, 419 (1942) (“[T]he ‘severability 
clause’ is generally a formulaic phrase, added almost as a matter of course whenever there is the least question 
as to the constitutionality of the statute. It is derived from a resentment against the power which the courts of 
the United States have so long exercised and which the legislature has accepted, although neither fully nor 
with good grace. The decision to take the severability clause literally, whenever it can be so taken, is an 
example of comity between coordinate branches of the government, but it is not an example of attempting to 
discover what was really intended.”). 
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leave the remaining language incoherent or unenforceable. And even if courts 
felt constrained to keep such language in place, it could have no legal 
consequence. There is no meaningful difference between striking a provision 
down and leaving it in place but denying it any legal effect. However a 
severability clause could have legal effect in the third type of implied 
severability case, where the remaining provision serves no plausible purpose 
without the invalidated provision. So, for example, if the law creating both the 
statue of Moses and the pedestal it rests on contained a severability clause, 
then the court would keep the pedestal in place. In such a case, the court infers 
conditionality from the uselessness of the remainder of the statute, but such an 
inference would be easily overcome by explicit textual instructions to sever. 
In summary, legislative conditionality can be found in four types of cases: 
(1) where the legislature instructs it (through an explicit inseverability clause, 
or possibly through legislative history suggesting conditionality); (2) where a 
severed statute’s text becomes nonsensical or takes on a totally accidental 
meaning; (3) where a remaining provision cannot be enforced; and (4) where a 
remaining provision serves no plausible purpose. Legislative conditionality 
cannot be found in cases where severing would merely have undesirable policy 
consequences, or where implicit conditionality is trumped by an explicit 
severability clause. 
C. The Need for Standing 
If a court believes that provision A is unconstitutional, and also believes 
that provisions A and B are inseverable, it will need a party with standing to 
challenge both A and B if it is to strike them both down. If the only case or 
controversy in the lawsuit is over A, then the court is powerless to dispose 
of B. This follows from the conditionality theory, but it is also true regardless 
of which theory of inseverability one adopts—any of the four approaches 
discussed in this Article would require a party to show a concrete injury from 
the challenged provision before it is struck down.162 It does not matter whether 
the ability to declare laws inseverable is a matter of statutory interpretation or 
of remedial power—it can only be exercised within the limits of Article III, 
which requires an active case or controversy before a court can provide any 
sort of remedy. And the fact that a party has standing to challenge one 
provision of a statute does not automatically grant that party standing to 
 
 162 See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818–20 (1997). 
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challenge other provisions.163 A party must separately establish standing for 
each form of relief sought.164 The Supreme Court recognized this principle in 
the severability context in Printz v. United States.165 In that case, it struck 
down a provision of the Brady Act requiring state officials to conduct 
background checks on people purchasing handguns.166 However the Court 
declined to consider whether the rest of the Brady Act was severable from this 
background checks requirement, because the parties before it lacked standing 
to challenge the law’s other provisions. The Court noted, “These are important 
questions, but we have no business answering them in these cases. These 
provisions burden only firearms dealers and purchasers, and no plaintiff in 
either of those categories is before us here. We decline to speculate regarding 
the rights and obligations of parties not before the Court.”167 In sum, there is 
no inseverability exception to the Article III standing requirement. 
The four dissenters in NFIB argued to the contrary. In deciding that the 
constitutional problems with the individual mandate required striking down the 
entire ACA, they found no barrier in the fact that the parties before them 
lacked standing to challenge many of the ACA’s provisions. The dissenters 
reasoned: 
To be sure, an argument can be made that those portions of the Act 
that none of the parties has standing to challenge cannot be held 
nonseverable. The response to this argument is that our cases do not 
support it. It would be particularly destructive of sound government 
to apply such a rule with regard to a multifaceted piece of legislation 
like the ACA. It would take years, perhaps decades, for each of its 
provisions to be adjudicated separately—and for some of them (those 
simply expending federal funds) no one may have separate standing. 
 
 163 See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 733–34 (2008) (“The fact that Davis has standing to challenge 
§ 319(b) does not necessarily mean that he also has standing to challenge the scheme of contribution 
limitations that applies when § 319(a) comes into play. ‘[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross.’ Rather, ‘a 
plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press’ and ‘for each form of relief’ that is 
sought.” (alteration in original) (quoting, in turn, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 (1996) and 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006)) (some internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 164 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (“Laidlaw is 
right to insist that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.”). But see 
Erik R. Zimmerman, Supplemental Standing for Severability, 109 NW. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) 
(manuscript at 7–9), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2428332 (noting this conflict between the Sebelius 
dissent and the Laidlaw principle that standing must be established for every claim, but arguing that it can be 
resolved through “supplemental standing”). 
 165 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 166 Id. at 933. 
 167 Id. at 935. 
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The Federal Government, the States, and private parties ought to 
know at once whether the entire legislation fails.168 
It may be true that an inseverability exception to the standing requirement 
would be desirable for judicial economy reasons. But that does not mean such 
an exception exists. The dissenters’ reasoning would seem to allow for 
advisory opinions whenever multiple adjudications would be “destructive of 
sound government.” But such disruption is a necessary cost to our ex post 
system of judicial review.169 In INS v. Chadha, the Court invalidated a type of 
provision—the legislative veto—that existed in 196 different statutes.170 But 
the Court did not then go on to issue advisory judgments on all of those 
statutes, much less determine whether each of their legislative veto provisions 
were severable.171 Such an exercise would have saved the federal courts 
considerable time and effort, and the entities affected by those statutes 
considerable uncertainty. But our system simply does not allow courts to pass 
judgment on statutes before a case or controversy has ripened.172 
Further, contra the NFIB dissenters, the administrability consequences of 
requiring Article III standing are not insurmountable. The Supreme Court 
embraced a case-by-case approach in Printz, refusing to decide severability 
questions that were not properly before it. And the resulting uncertainty over 
whether the rest of the Brady Act remains valid has not created major 
problems. To the extent that uncertainty is disruptive, embracing the 
conditionality theory would drastically improve the situation by making 
severability determinations more predictable. Legislative conditionality does 
not permit a court to find part of a statute inseverable on policy grounds. Thus 
it limits the number of situations where the fate of the statutory remainder is 
left uncertain. Unless the remaining provisions of the statute appear to be 
textually incoherent, unenforceable, or totally without purpose, they will be 
 
 168 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2671 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (citing 
Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of La.,  278 U.S. 235, 242–44 (1929)). 
 169 See Brianne J. Gorod, The Collateral Consequences of Ex Post Judicial Review, 88 WASH. L. REV. 
903, 904 (2013). 
 170 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983). 
 171 Id. at 959. 
 172 The dissent in NFIB also seems to contradict the general principle that a person who is burdened by 
provision A cannot, except under limited circumstances, sue to invalidate a statute because provision B is 
unconstitutional and inseverable from provision A. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973) 
(“Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to 
whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it 
may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others . . . .”). If severability determinations do not require 
standing, it is difficult to see why a party could not bring this kind of challenge. 
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severable. Such situations are generally easy to spot and could be pointed out 
in dicta. The Supreme Court may also, if seeking to avoid uncertainty, grant 
certiorari only to plaintiffs that have standing to challenge possibly inseverable 
provisions, or allow plaintiffs with such standing to join a case at a later 
procedural stage.173 But creating a sui generis inseverability exception to the 
standing requirement is not an option. 
D. Conditionality Is Not Limited to the Same Bill or Act 
A final implication of the conditionality theory is that any provision in a 
legislative code can be found inseverable from any other provision in the code. 
Legislative conditionality cannot be confined to a single bill or act because 
conditionality is ultimately a legislative decision, and the legislature is not 
bound by such formal categories. If it decides to make a provision in one law 
conditional on a provision in an entirely separate law, it can do so. This fact 
does not create a major problem for the conditionality theory in the same way 
that it would for the hypothetical intent theory or the remedial power theory, 
because conditionality does not afford judges nearly as much discretion as 
those other theories. With the hypothetical intent or remedial theories, a court 
might comb through the entire code looking for legislative language to find 
inseverable on policy grounds. But the conditionality theory does not permit 
that, because it does not allow courts to find provisions inseverable simply 
because severing them creates policy problems. A court would only be able to 
find different enactments conditional if it could fit them into one of the 
categories discussed in Part V.B. For example, if Congress enacts one bill 
providing for construction of an unconstitutional statue, and later appropriates 
funding for that statue through an entirely separate bill, the funding provision 
can be found conditional on the provision creating the statue. Similarly, if 
Congress passes a bill creating an agency, and then many years later passes a 
separate bill providing certain new powers to that agency, the language 
granting the powers is conditional on the language creating the agency even 
though they are in separate bills (and, indeed, even if they are in separate acts 
and titles). 
 
 173 Another potential solution for complex statutes with many provisions would be to articulate the 
severability ruling broadly. Imagine that a statute has five provisions: A, B, C, D, and E. A is unconstitutional, 
and the parties before the court only have standing to challenge A and B. The court might, in some cases, 
articulate its inseverability decision in a way that clearly applies to C, D, and E as well. Of course it could only 
do so if all of the provisions were inseverable for the same reason. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary, 
As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000). 
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This is a counterintuitive approach to severability because it abandons the 
idea that the question “is it severable?” should be confined to discrete 
enactments. But it is the correct approach, because Congress often intends 
provisions to work in concert even where it does not enact them as part of the 
same bill or act. A legislative code is an intricate tapestry, and laws are 
interwoven in many different ways. They can refer to and rely on one another 
explicitly, or the legislature can assume the presence of one when enacting 
another. Consider the Americans with Disabilities Act. Its remedial section 
simply cross-references Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and states 
that all remedies available under Title VII are also available under the ADA.174 
Thus if the Supreme Court were to declare Title VII unconstitutional, the ADA 
might, under one potential interpretation, no longer provide any remedies. Or 
consider the Prison Litigation Reform Act175 and the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act.176 These two laws were enacted at the same time 
to restrict two different types of prisoner litigation—Section 1983 suits and 
habeas petitions—that often cover similar subject matter. The main provisions 
of each law could thus logically be understood to assume and rely on one 
another. If courts limited severability inquiries to formalistic groupings of 
legislative language such as “bills” or “acts,” they would miss such 
cross-pollination, which is a common feature of modern law. 
VI. LEGISLATIVE CONDITIONALITY IN PRACTICE 
This last Part considers several pragmatic concerns about legislative 
conditionality. In a sense, one should not care if the theory works in practice, 
so long as it is the only one consistent with Article III. But if it forces us to 
accept crazy results, it loses much of its shine. And we are not necessarily 
stuck with it, even if it is theoretically pristine. Congress could pass a law 
empowering judges to declare statutes inseverable for policy reasons,177 or we 
could embrace one of the other theories despite its problems and muddle 
through. No system is without flaws, and better to let judges stray from a 
marked trail than insist they follow it over a cliff. Fortunately, legislative 
 
 174 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2012) (“The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 
2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this 
subchapter provides to the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to any person alleging discrimination on 
the basis of disability in violation of any provision of this chapter, or regulations promulgated under section 
12116 of this title, concerning employment.”). 
 175 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-131, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to 1321-77. 
 176 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
 177 This might, however, raise nondelegation issues. See supra note 110. 
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conditionality does not force this choice. It is easily brought into practice, its 
harms can be mitigated, and its benefits are substantial. 
A. Legislative Fixes 
The main cost of the conditionality theory is that it gives courts few tools to 
deal with statutory distortion. Inseverability exists only where a court can 
credibly interpret a law as making one provision conditional on another. Thus, 
a court cannot find parts of a law inseverable merely because leaving them in 
place would have negative consequences or undermine the law’s purpose. This 
means that the remainders of statutes like the ACA, the Sentencing Reform 
Act, and the Federal Election Campaign Act must remain in place even though 
major provisions have been stripped out through constitutional review. The 
judiciary can take away language to make laws conform to the Constitution, 
but it cannot take away more language to maintain sensible policy. 
That is not the end of the story, however. Congress can amend or repeal a 
statute that has been partially invalidated. As the Supreme Court noted in 
Booker, “Ours, of course, is not the last word: The ball now lies in Congress’ 
court.”178 Judicial distortion of statutes can be action forcing; it can push 
Congress to debate and enact a new law that will fix the mess the Court has left 
behind.179 Judicial severance could thus be seen as part of an ongoing 
constitutional dialogue between the branches, which generates new legislative 
ideas that avoid constitutional problems while still achieving Congress’s policy 
goals. This idea has become influential in Canadian constitutional law, where 
many scholars view judicial review as an ongoing process of 
judicial-legislative dialogue.180 There is empirical support for such a pattern: 
recent work by Matthew Christiansen and William Eskridge has shown that 
Congress sometimes overrides the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation 
opinions. From 1967 to 2011, 275 Supreme Court opinions have been 
overridden by Congress.181 These overrides peaked in the 1990s, fell off 
precipitously after the Clinton impeachment, and are (or so Christiansen and 
 
 178 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222, 265 (2005). 
 179 See J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 66−67 (2004) (arguing that major Supreme Court cases can prompt and 
shape debates over new legislation). 
 180 See, e.g., Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushnell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and 
Legislators (or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75, 
79–80 (1997). 
 181 See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court 
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1328–29 (2014). 
FISH GALLEYS PROOFS 4/29/2015 1:15 PM 
2015] SEVERABILITY AS CONDITIONALITY 1349 
Eskridge predict) likely to make a comeback in the coming years.182 While the 
Christiansen and Eskridge study does not consider overrides in constitutional 
review cases, it does show that a significant number of overrides occur when 
Congress believes that a Supreme Court decision has undermined a statute’s 
purpose.183 This evidence suggests that overrides will also sometimes occur 
after constitutional review cases that result in distortion of a statute. 
When the Court strikes down part of a law, Congress is capable of 
repealing or amending the remainder, or of choosing to leave the partially 
invalid law in place. More expansive approaches to severability would ignore 
the possibility of a legislative fix and give the judiciary the first crack at 
revising statutes. But there is no reason for judges to be doing Congress’s job 
when Congress is able. For example, in NFIB, if the Court had struck down the 
individual mandate but left the rest of the ACA in place, it is difficult to 
imagine that Congress would have let insurance costs and premiums rise 
precipitously, especially given how powerful the insurance lobby is. Congress 
might have enacted insurance subsidies, repealed further provisions of the 
ACA, or crafted some other fix, possibly after delaying the law’s 
implementation.184 Legislative responses of that sort are a much better solution 
to statutory distortion, because they give the problem of fixing the statute to 
the branch with the most democratic legitimacy and expertise in lawmaking. 
Overrides are not the only tool available to Congress—it can also decide 
severability questions ex ante through explicit inseverability clauses. And the 
conditionality theory gives Congress a greater incentive to make use of such 
clauses, because it renders the judiciary’s severability decisions much more 
predictable. Under the status quo doctrine, the legislature can anticipate that if 
part of a statute is rendered unconstitutional, the courts will make essentially a 
policy determination about whether the remainder can be severed. But 
legislative conditionality prevents such judicial policymaking—if Congress 
 
 182 See id. at 1325 n.31. 
 183 See id. at 1371–73. This type of override has continued even in the relative drought of the 2000s. See 
id. at 1375 (“[T]he recent era of fewer overrides still has managed to adopt a good many restorative 
overrides.”). 
 184 See Transcript, supra note 15, at 73 (“JUSTICE SCALIA: . . . You can’t repeal the rest of the Act 
because you’re not going to get 60 votes in the Senate to repeal the rest. It’s not a matter of enacting a new 
Act. You got to get 60 votes to repeal it. So, the rest of the Act is going to be the law. So, you’re just put to the 
choice of, I guess, bankrupting insurance companies and the whole system comes tumbling down, or else 
enacting a Federal subsidy program to the insurance companies, which is what the insurance companies would 
like, I’m sure.”); Adam D. Chandler & Luke Norris, How Conservatives Could Revive the Public Option, 
SLATE (Jan. 7, 2011, 1:26 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/01/how_ 
conservatives_could_revive_the_public_option.html. 
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wants one part of a law to stand or fall with another, it must say so explicitly. 
In this sense, legislative conditionality works as a preference-eliciting punitive 
default rule.185 It establishes a general default that statutory language is 
severable except in a few narrow circumstances, and forces Congress to reveal 
any legislative preference it has for inseverability by writing an explicit clause. 
Thus, if Congress had wished to avoid the problems that would have attended 
striking down the individual mandate in the ACA, it would have known to 
make the law’s provisions textually inseverable from each other and not to rely 
on the courts to solve the problem (as the Obama administration ultimately did 
by arguing that the law was partially inseverable).186 This approach is only 
possible where Congress successfully predicts a constitutional challenge, but 
that sometimes happens. For instance, during the debate over the 
McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform bill,187 Congress considered and 
rejected a clause that would have made the law’s ban on soft money 
inseverable from its restrictions on issue ads.188 And Congress has enacted 
inseverability clauses in the past.189 The conditionality theory could prompt 
more such debates, causing the legislative branch to plan for the contingencies 
of judicial review.190 
 
 185 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89, 115 (1989); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default 
Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002). 
 186  See Brief for Respondents (Severability), supra note 70. The reverse approach of striking down the 
entire bill if part of it is unconstitutional, unless there is a severability clause, would also work as a 
preference-eliciting default rule. This strategy would force Congress to specify when it wants a statute made 
severable, or else lose everything in a bill. However, this is a less effective punitive default because it is easily 
reversed by Congress through the use of pro forma severability clauses (indeed, that is Congress’s practice 
now). The conditionality approach, by contrast, compels Congress to specify which clauses it wants made 
conditional on which other clauses. Presumably, Congress would not start putting pro forma inseverability 
clauses in every bill. 
 187 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81. 
 188 See Excerpts from Senate Debate on Donations: Skirmishing and Predictions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 
2001, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/30/us/excerpts-from-senate-debate-on-donations-
skirmishing-and-predictions.html [hereinafter Excerpts] (“The Senate is being asked to pass an amendment 
that would make two provisions of this bill non-severable, one from another.”). 
 189 See, e.g., 4 U.S.C. § 125 (2012) (“If a court of competent jurisdiction enters a final judgment on the 
merits that . . . substantially limits or impairs the essential elements of sections 116 through 126 of this title, 
then sections 116 through 126 of this title are invalid and have no legal effect as of the date of entry of such 
judgment.”); 25 U.S.C. § 1760 (2012) (“In the event that any provision of section 1753 of this title is held 
invalid, it is the intent of Congress that the entire subchapter be invalidated.”). 
 190 Presently inseverability clauses are fairly rare, occurring at a rate of roughly one per year as of 2001. 
See Excerpts, supra note 188 (“[D]uring the last 12 years only 12 bills have been introduced, let alone passed, 
that contain a nonseverability clause.”). 
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Now consider the reverse problem. When the Supreme Court finds a law 
inseverable, not only does it leave Congress’s goals entirely unvindicated, it 
also renders futile all of the political and deliberative processes that led to the 
law’s enactment. At least a partial invalidation leaves the law’s supporters with 
something to build on. Congress cannot easily reenact entire statutes like the 
ACA, the Sentencing Reform Act, and Federal Election Campaign Act. These 
were major transformative laws that were the subjects of lengthy and intense 
debate, were passed in response to specific historical catalysts, and were 
enacted by political coalitions that are no longer in power. To undo them is 
essentially to rewind politics, and in some cases to erase the results of one or 
more national elections.191 Take the ACA as an example. The ACA could only 
be enacted after the Democratic Party won a presidential election and, through 
several successive congressional elections, obtained a majority in the House of 
Representatives and a sixty-vote supermajority in the Senate. The Democrats 
spent a year passing various versions of the ACA through each chamber of 
Congress, encountering intense opposition from the Republican Party.192 The 
enactment of this law dominated national politics for basically an entire term 
of Congress and the first two years of a new presidency. And by the time NFIB 
was decided in 2012, there was no way Congress was going to enact the ACA 
again—Republicans had taken control of the House of Representatives, and 
America was in the midst of a presidential election. Thus if the Supreme Court 
had struck down the entire ACA because part of it was unconstitutional, it 
would not just have been deciding that a partial law was worse than no law at 
all. It would have been undoing all the deliberative and political events that 
formed that law’s history.  
This is not respectful of the democratic process. When the Court strikes 
down part of a law but leaves the rest intact, it may badly distort how the law 
operates. But it will at least avoid a situation where the law’s entire 
deliberative and political history comes to nothing. The political coalition that 
supports the original law will still have parts to rebuild with, broken though 
they may be. And if a rebuilding operation proves impossible, Congress can 
repeal the law. But finding a statute inseverable so as to create a clean slate 
usurps the power of the enacting legislature, especially when a court bases 
 
 191 Severability also affects less significant statutes, of course, but these are less important when we are 
considering the practical effects of legislative conditionality. 
 192 See Emily Smith, Timeline of the Health Care Law, CNN (June 28, 2012, 10:24 AM ET), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/28/politics/supreme-court-health-timeline; see also Carl Hulse & Jeff Zeleny, 
Democrats Seem Set to Go it Alone on a Health Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2009, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/19/health/policy/19repubs.html. 
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such a finding on policy arguments. It is better to let the elected branches 
muddle through than to have courts fully erase the fruits of our national debate. 
In sum, the conditionality theory has one major cost: it prevents the courts 
from avoiding statutory distortion because it denies the judiciary the power to 
declare laws inseverable for policy reasons. This cost is mitigated by 
legislative overrides, and by the fact that the conditionality theory gives 
legislators an incentive to use inseverability clauses. The conditionality theory 
also carries a significant advantage. It prevents the judiciary from reversing 
national debates over policy matters by invalidating entire statutes. Because it 
usually forces the judiciary to leave the remainder of a statute in place, the 
conditionality theory allows the outcome of a prior debate to frame the national 
discussion going forward. Rather than rewinding politics, it lets politics play 
on. 
B. State Statutes and State Courts 
So far this Article has focused primarily on federal statutes, but state 
statutes also give rise to severability questions. This section considers how 
both federal and state courts should apply the conditionality theory of 
severability when they consider state statutes. 
When a federal court finds part of a state statute unconstitutional, any 
severability issues must be decided under state law. Thus the conditionality 
theory must yield to state interpretive rules. This follows from the logic of 
Erie193—state laws are governed by state principles of statutory interpretation, 
not by federal principles.194 And all of the states have adopted their own 
severability formulas either through statutes, judicial rulings, or both.195 Some 
states, like Minnesota, employ principles that closely resemble federal law, 
namely the intent test and the hypothetical passage test.196 Other states, like 
 
 193 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 194 See Michael C. Dorf, The Heterogeneity of Rights, 6 LEGAL THEORY 269, 290 (2000) (“[S]everability 
is in turn a question of statutory construction, and in a challenge to a state law, state rather than federal 
principles of statutory construction govern.”); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodology As “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1990–91 (2011). 
 195 Dorf, supra note 11, at 295 (“Every state except Tennessee and Virginia employs a presumption of 
severability, unless the statute in question includes a nonseverability clause. In general, state courts hold that 
provisions and applications of statutes are severable.”); Gluck, supra note 194, at 1950 (“[W]ith respect to 
avoidance’s cousin, severability, forty-eight states have a statute, a judicial decision, or both requiring courts to 
apply a presumption of severability.”); see also Dorf, supra note 11, at 295–304 (surveying the severability 
laws of all fifty states). 
 196 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 645.20 (West 1947). 
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Wisconsin, flatly declare everything severable without exception.197 And two 
states—Virginia and Tennessee—adopt presumptions against severability.198 
A state’s laws are enacted in the context of its established severability rules. 
Thus, when a federal court strikes down part of a state law, it should either not 
address inseverability at all, or it should explicitly leave the question to the 
state courts. This is generally the approach that the Supreme Court has taken, 
with a few exceptions.199 It has explicitly recognized that “[s]everability is of 
course a matter of state law.”200 And it has deferred to state courts even in the 
most obvious cases. For instance, in Zobel v. Williams the Court determined 
that an Alaska statute was partly unconstitutional, and even though the statute 
contained an explicit inseverability clause, the Court left it to the Alaska courts 
to decide whether other parts of the statute were inseverable.201 
If a federal court does succumb to the urge to find a state statute 
inseverable, it can only do so by applying state severability rules. But this 
possibility raises another issue. Most state systems have severability doctrines 
that are similar to the current federal doctrine, letting state courts strike down 
additional language under the intent test and the hypothetical passage test.202 
But a federal court cannot apply such tests because it is constrained by 
Article III. Therefore, even if a state court can legitimately exercise its 
remedial power to find a statute inseverable for policy reasons, a federal court 
cannot do the same. The federal court would not merely be interpreting state 
law in such a case. It would be usurping a state court’s remedial power to 
delete parts of statutes. And as shown above, a federal court cannot exercise 
such power consistent with Article III. Thus, if a federal court is to declare a 
state statute inseverable, it can only do so in circumstances where the state law 
is inseverable due to state principles of statutory construction: that is, where 
the legislature has made the statute inseverable, either explicitly or implicitly, 
and the court is merely recognizing that fact through judicial interpretation. It 
cannot do so when a state’s severability rules call on state judges to exercise 
 
 197 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 990.001(11) (West 2007). 
 198 See Vollmer v. City of Memphis, 730 S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. 1987); Bd. of Supervisors v. Rowe, 
216 S.E.2d 199 (Va. 1975); see also Dorf, supra note 11, at 301–03. 
 199 See supra note 35 (noting that the Supreme Court has declared state statutes inseverable in only six 
cases, by my count, since 1940); see also Scoville, supra note 34, at 564–69 (surveying severability decisions 
after Erie and concluding that “the Court generally settled upon the rule that the sovereign whose statute is at 
issue dictates the severance test”). 
 200 Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996) (per curiam). 
 201 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982). 
 202 See Dorf, supra note 11, at 295. 
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their remedial power to strike down further statutory provisions for policy 
reasons. 
A further question is whether state courts should also adopt the 
conditionality theory. This will depend on the features of a particular state’s 
legal system. Some states establish their severability rules by statute. For 
example the legislature of Kentucky has enacted a law instructing judges to 
apply both the hypothetical passage test and the intent test in severability 
decisions (essentially the same as in federal doctrine),203 while the legislature 
of Iowa has enacted a law that only permits judges to find a provision 
inseverable if it “cannot be given effect” without the invalid provision (similar 
to the approach advocated in this Article).204 In states like Kentucky and Iowa 
that have codified severability rules, those rules serve as a delegation of 
remedial power—the legislature has empowered judges to declare provisions 
inseverable and instructed them how and when to do so. But in the absence of 
an explicit statute, judges must interpret the constitutional system of the state 
to determine how broad their severability power is. The bulk of this Article has 
been devoted to showing that the general plan of the federal judiciary—the 
limits imposed by Article III, the political question doctrine, the narrowness of 
federal common law, etc.—is inconsistent with a broad power to find statutes 
inseverable. But these structural arguments have somewhat less force in most 
state systems. State judges have general jurisdiction, and have much broader 
authority to create common law than do federal courts. State judges are usually 
elected, which diminishes the countermajoritarian problem when they engage 
in political decisionmaking.205 And many states permit third-party lawsuits and 
advisory opinions because they lack a jurisdictional “case or controversy” 
requirement. These features of state systems make them seem broadly more 
compatible with the remedial or hypothetical intent theories of severability, 
 
 203 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.090 (West 2006) (“It shall be considered that it is the intent of the General 
Assembly, in enacting any statute, that if any part of the statute be held unconstitutional the remaining parts 
shall remain in force, unless the statute provides otherwise, or unless the remaining parts are so essentially and 
inseparably connected with and dependent upon the unconstitutional part that it is apparent that the General 
Assembly would not have enacted the remaining parts without the unconstitutional part, or unless the 
remaining parts, standing alone, are incomplete and incapable of being executed in accordance with the intent 
of the General Assembly.”). 
 204 IOWA CODE ANN. § 4.12 (West 2008) (“If any provision of an Act or statute or the application thereof 
to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of 
the Act or statute which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the 
provisions of the Act or statute are severable.”). 
 205 Cf. David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047 
(2010) (considering the impact of judicial elections on the legitimacy of constitutional change). 
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which permit judges to strike down additional portions of a partially invalid 
statute in order to make it more workable or to preserve the legislature’s 
intentions. 
C. Does Legislative Conditionality Fit the Most Recent Cases? 
A final issue is whether the conditionality theory requires a sharp break 
from the Supreme Court’s current severability jurisprudence. Doctrinal 
consistency is a special concern in the severability context, since Congress 
presumably relies on the judiciary’s prior severability practice when drafting 
new legislation. One might argue that courts should not change the way they 
decide severability cases, since Congress enacts laws with the existing 
severability rules in mind. The conditionality theory presented in this Article 
would, admittedly, require changing the official doctrine substantially. The 
Court would have to jettison the intent test and the hypothetical passage test, 
keep the independence test, and add tests for the other two kinds of implied 
conditionality (a “textual incoherence” test and a “no independent purpose” 
test). But legislative conditionality fits remarkably well with the Supreme 
Court’s actual severability decisions, given that the Court has so rarely found a 
statute inseverable. Since 1940, the Court has only declared part of a federal 
statute inseverable in one case, Booker, and has declared part of an executive 
order inseverable in another case, Mille Lacs (it has held a handful of state 
statutes inseverable, but as previously noted, these cases are governed by state 
severability rules).206 Since legislative conditionality would compel judges to 
find statutes severable in all but a narrow set of cases, this modern tendency to 
make everything severable fits the theory well. Thus we should not expect too 
much disruption if the Supreme Court were to embrace it.  
Legislative conditionality also comports with the Court’s emphasis on 
legislative intent. In Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 
the Court announced three principles that would govern its severability 
analysis: 
First, we try not to nullify more of a legislature’s work than is 
necessary, for we know that “[a] ruling of unconstitutionality 
frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people.” . . . 
Second, mindful that our constitutional mandate and institutional 
competence are limited, we restrain ourselves from “rewrit[ing] state 
law to conform it to constitutional requirements” even as we strive to 
 
 206 See supra note 35; see also supra Part VI.B. 
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salvage it. . . . Third, the touchstone for any decision about remedy is 
legislative intent, for a court cannot “use its remedial powers to 
circumvent the intent of the legislature.”207 
The conditionality theory follows these three principles better than any other. It 
prevents a court from nullifying more of a law than necessary, and it restrains 
the court from rewriting laws. It also puts the court’s focus exclusively on 
interpreting the legislature’s intent—not a hypothetical intent gleaned from the 
legislature’s general policy ideas, but a specific intent concerning what would 
happen if part of the statute were struck down. The conditionality theory thus 
seems to fit the thrust and emphasis of current law quite well. All that remains 
is to consider whether it is consistent with the two cases in which federal laws 
were found inseverable—Mille Lacs and Booker. 
In Mille Lacs, the Chippewa sued for the right to hunt and fish without state 
regulation on certain lands in Minnesota. At issue was the legality of an 1850 
executive order revoking those rights from the Chippewa. The order contained 
two relevant provisions, the first stating that “The privileges granted 
temporarily to the Chippewa Indians . . . ‘of hunting, fishing and gathering the 
wild rice, upon the lands, the rivers and the lakes included in the territory 
ceded’ . . . are hereby revoked” and the second that “all of the said Indians 
remaining on the lands ceded as aforesaid, are required to remove to their 
unceded lands.”208 The Court determined that the removal provision was 
unlawful because it was not authorized by any federal law and that the 
provision revoking hunting and fishing rights was inseverable from the 
removal provision. Can the conditionality theory support this decision? The 
order contained no explicit inseverability clause, and the revocation of fishing 
rights remained textually coherent, was capable of being enforced, and had a 
plausible independent purpose (preventing hunting and fishing) without the 
removal provision. Thus, if the Court’s finding of inseverability is to be 
justified, it must be because the legislative history of the order shows that the 
President intended that its parts be mutually conditional. The majority argued 
precisely this, claiming that “[w]e think it is clear that President Taylor 
intended the 1850 order to stand or fall as a whole.”209 However its evidence 
from the legislative history is fairly weak—it only cites the fact that during 
 
 207 546 U.S. 320, 329–30 (2006) (alterations in original) (quoting, in turn, Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 
641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion), Virginia v. American Booksellers Association, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988), 
and Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 94 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 208 Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 179 (1999) (some internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 209 Id. at 191. 
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enforcement of the order, the Governor of Minnesota and the Minnesota 
legislature “explicitly tied revocation of the treaty privileges to removal.”210 In 
normal circumstances, this would not be sufficient to demonstrate that one part 
of the order was meant to be conditional on another.211 However, the decision 
might still be justified by the longstanding doctrine that statutes will be 
liberally construed to favor the interests of Native American tribes.212 And 
even if the result in Mille Lacs cannot be defended under the conditionality 
theory, the Court at least framed the inquiry properly—the question was 
whether President Taylor intended the two parts of the order to stand or fall 
together, that is, whether the President meant for one part to actually be 
conditional on the other, not merely whether the President thought that one part 
was a bad policy without the other. 
In Booker, the Court struck down Section 3553(b)(1) of the Sentencing 
Reform Act, which had made the Guidelines mandatory for federal judges. The 
Court also invalidated Section 3742(e) of the SRA, finding that it was 
inseverable from Section 3553(b)(1) because it “depends on the Guidelines’ 
mandatory nature.”213 Section 3742(e) established de novo appellate review for 
departures from the Guidelines. It is easy to see why this section would be 
deemed inseverable under the conditionality theory: Section 3742(e) cannot be 
enforced without Section 3553(b)(1). First, Section 3742(e) explicitly 
cross-references Section 3553(b) as a basis for invalidating a statute on 
appeal.214 If Section 3553(b) is struck down, then, that part of Section 3742(e) 
cannot be enforced. Second, and more broadly, if the Guidelines are not 
mandatory, then it is not logically possible to provide de novo review for a 
lower court’s failure to follow them. The Court was thus fully justified in 
striking down the parts of Section 3742(e) that concerned appellate review of 
departures from the Guidelines. However, it was not justified in striking down 
all of Section 3742(e), which contained several clauses that could still be given 
full effect even if the Guidelines were advisory. The provision also provided 
for de novo review and reversal if a sentence “was imposed in violation of 
law,” “was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing 
guidelines,” was based on a departure factor that is “not justified by the facts of 
 
 210 Id. at 193. 
 211 See id. at 215–16 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he order’s termination of the treaty privileges 
should be sustained unless the Chippewa are able to clearly demonstrate that President Taylor would not have 
terminated them without a removal order. But there is no such evidence . . . .”). 
 212 See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766–68 (1985). 
 213 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 214 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(B)(ii) (2012), invalidated by Booker, 543 U.S. 220. 
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the case,” or if the district court “failed to provide the written statement of 
reasons required by section 3553(c).” All of these clauses are perfectly valid 
even if Section 3553(b) is struck down and the Guidelines made fully 
nonmandatory. The Court’s severability holding in Booker is thus only 
partially supportable under the conditionality theory. 
The holding in Mille Lacs is probably inconsistent with the conditionality 
theory, and the holding in Booker is partly justifiable but goes too far. So if the 
Court were to embrace legislative conditionality, there would be a small cost to 
the principle of stare decisis. But this theory is nonetheless more consistent 
with modern severability practice than is the current doctrine. While federal 
courts are able to use very broad tests to find a law inseverable—looking at 
whether the severed statute would hypothetically have been passed by 
Congress, or whether it is consistent with Congress’s broad intentions—they 
have done so in only two cases, one of which involved an executive order. And 
even in those cases they have approached severability questions with a scalpel, 
severing single provisions rather than destroying the entire law (the dissent in 
NFIB notwithstanding). This rarity of inseverability findings helps to answer 
the reliance objection. Findings of inseverability are like lightning bolts: they 
happen so uncommonly that they cannot really be prepared for. Thus Congress 
cannot meaningfully be said to rely on current doctrine in enacting its laws, 
and indeed the conditionality theory fits the courts’ practice better than current 
doctrine. More than any other theory, legislative conditionality explains and 
justifies this modern approach. It accounts for why courts should sever in the 
overwhelming majority of cases and should fail to sever only in a few narrow 
and easily identified circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to show that inseverability only exists where the 
legislature instructs the courts that one part of a statute must stand or fall 
alongside another. This happens most obviously where the legislature writes an 
explicit inseverability clause, or makes it clear in the legislative history that 
two provisions are conditional on one another. But a legislature can also make 
statutes conditional implicitly by choosing to write them a particular way. If 
severing part of the statute leaves another part textually incoherent, incapable 
of being given effect, or utterly pointless, the two are implicitly inseverable. 
But, contrary to current doctrine, a court cannot find a provision inseverable 
simply because invalidating it would advance the legislature’s policy goals. 
The Article has defended this theory, showing that its alternatives are unsound 
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and its consequences sanguine. Along the way, it has also shown that a party 
must have standing to challenge a provision for that provision to be found 
inseverable, and that any two provisions in the entire code can be inseverable 
from each other (meaning a court is not limited to provisions that share the 
same bill, act, or title). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this Article has 
connected the severability issue to deeper questions about the nature of judges’ 
power in our constitutional system. It has broadened the inquiry from “what 
should severability doctrine look like?” to “what gives judges the power to 
make things inseverable in the first place?” Hopefully, in the process, it has 
brought some clarity to a very confusing legal issue. 
 
